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ASYMMETRIC DYNAMISM AND ACCEPTABLE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
AWARDS
Jeffrey W. Stempel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Law aspires (at least in large part) to consistency and predictability. 1 The genius
of the common law was in part the benefits of treating like cases alike.2 Although the
post-modern, multi-faceted legal profession of today may not always agree on the
similarity or difference of cases,3 much less correct outcomes,4 one would expect at least
*
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1
Law of course also has many other aspirations as well: fact-finding; enforcing legal rights; justice;
fostering adequate incentives and sounder public policy, to name a few. Rank ordering them is well
beyond the scope of this article. But without doubt, a substantial segment of the legal community places
consistency and predictability high on the list of laws goals. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 60-65 (2007) (claiming that law favors objective
standards that enhance predictability and minimize discretion and attendant costs); Kelly Casey Mullally,
Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2010) (“Concern
for certainty is ubiquitous in the law. Some degree of determinacy in the content and application of
governing rules is necessary for individuals to identify the scope of their rights and to ensure that their
conduct conforms to legal constraints, at least in contexts where ex ante decision making is possible. The
law forms the basis for many social and economic expectations, and legal thinkers naturally have some
interest in certainty. Certainty, in terms of predictability of results, is necessary to view law-making
institutions as legitimate sources of authority. Lawyers should be able to use the law as a guide to what
courts will do in future cases; otherwise, a lack of certainty can cause the public to abandon legal
institutions.”); Mark P. Gergen, The Jury's Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American Common
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 423 (1999) (“A virtue of the common law method is that it enables us to
proceed without resolving fundamental questions of value by limiting the issues on which conflicts in
values are worked out to a manageable set that is fluid over time. A useful way to think of the common law
is as a set of institutional mechanisms for resolving private disputes that attempts to be at once stable and
mutable: stable, because of the high value placed within the system on tradition and conformity; mutable,
because of the ineffable and fluid character of its rules, standards, and principles.”); Keith N. Hylton, Fee
Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427 (1995).
2
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 13 (1982).
3
See Richard S. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 765 (1987) (noting “remarkable political consensus of the late 1950s and early 1960s” that was in
tune with the strong consensus of the law as reflected in the Harvard Legal Process school championed by
Hart and Sacks).
Since 1940, and especially since 1952, there had been little ideological difference
between the major parties. At least in the academy, the radical right had been discredited,
first by its isolationism and then by its racism, and the radical left had been squashed by
the Cold War. Secular, humanistic, patriotic, and centrist, the American intellectual
scene in the late 1950s and early 1960s was remarkably free from ideological strife.

1

that courts would hew to roughly the same methodology across cases, aspects of a single
case, or sections of a specific statute. This is not to say that there will never be
jurisprudential differences between “mainstream” judges.5 We know, for example, that
Justice Scalia is a textualist when approaching statutes (and legal texts generally)6 while
Justice Breyer gives substantial consideration to legislative intent and the views of
administrative agencies.7 But despite these differences, one would expect the Supreme
Court as a whole to be at least relatively consistent when addressing the same statute.
However, since the Court’s embrace of arbitration in the mid-1980s, it has tended
to apply a dynamic, expansive model of statutory construction when considering the
question of when to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses but applied a different
standard to questions regarding the conduct of arbitration and review of arbitration
awards, a standard grounded more in history and tradition.8
When deciding whether to require arbitration, the court has not been very
concerned, if at all, about achieving the legislature’s intent or even the language of the
statute. Instead, the Court has applied a highly relaxed notion of consent in enforcing
even the most boilerplate of arbitration clauses upon unsophisticated disputants who had
little bargaining power in the transaction that led to the contract containing the arbitration
*
*
*
[Even] many of the leading [legal] realists had been coopted into the judiciary and into
the drafting of uniform laws and other mainstream legal activities, [and] it was widely
believed that the law had been restored to a position of political neutrality.
Id. at 765-766. See also DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS
IN THE FIFTIES (1960).
4
In the quarter-century since Posner commented on the decline of law as an autonomous discipline,
American politics has if anything become more discordant. See Thomas B. Edsall, Studies: Conservatives
Are From Mars, Liberals Are From Venus, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:00 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/02/studies-conservatives-are-from-mars-liberals-arefrom-venus/252416/; Thomas B. Edsall, The Culture War and the Jobs Crisis, CAMPAIGN STOPS (Nov. 11,
2012, 10:45 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/edsall-the-culture-war-and-the-jobscrisis/ (“In a study based on 2008 polling, Abramowitz found majorities or solid pluralities of voters
formed consistently liberal or conservative views – not centrist positions – on a continuum of issues
including gay rights and abortion; off-shore oil drilling; the Iraq war; health care; financial regulation;
climate change and mortgage assistance to low-income homeowners.”); ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., RED
STATE, BLUE STATE, RICH STATE POOR STATE (2008).
5
The mainstream in American law is fairly broad and can be seen as running from Bork himself on the
right (notwithstanding Bork’s nomination defeat) to the late NYU Law and Oxford Professor Ronald
Dworkin, a strong advocate of government-supported equality on the left. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 428 (1990) (discussing an observation first made in Posner, The Decline of
Law as an Autonomous Discipline, supra note 3, at 766). Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (1978) (suggesting constrained view of antitrust enforcement and perhaps even that antitrust
legislation was a mistake); with RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) (taking expansive
view of what law demands in terms of individual civil rights and permits in terms of government
intervention to benefit the disempowered in programs such as affirmative action).
6
See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 146 (2012).
7
See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845, 847 (1992) (supporting use of legislative history as tool for statutory construction) [hereinafter On the
Uses of Legislative History]; accord Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A Practicing Judge’s Perspective,
78 TEX. L. REV. 761, 766 (2000) (same) [hereinafter Judicial Review].
8
See infra notes 159-260 and accompanying text.
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clause.9 But when the issue concerns arbitration administration such as the power of the
arbitrators to give class-wide treatment to a dispute, or limitations on the sweep of the
Federal Arbitration Act,10 the Court has taken the opposite approach, restricting class
treatment,11 narrowing the seemingly clear text of a provision excepting workers from the
Act,12 or resisting expanded review of awards even if agreed to by the parties.13
This inconsistency – loving arbitration one minute when essentially cramming
down a mass arbitration clause upon consumers in the next minute while overturning the
decision of three experienced commercial arbitrators to process a price-fixing dispute on
a class-wide basis14 – is hard to square with traditional notions of sound jurisprudence.
Cynics can be forgiven for concluding that the only apparent unifying principle of the
9

See infra notes 116-118, 131-177 and accompanying text. This relaxed attitude toward consent and
willingness to impose contract terms even in cases of highly questionable consent extends beyond the
Court’s arbitration precedents. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing
pre-printed forum selection clause in small type on the back of a cruise ship ticket). See Cheryl B. Preston
& Eli McCann, Llewellyn Slept Here: A Short History of Sticky Contracts and Feudalism, 91 OR. L. REV.
129, 167-70 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has championed a relaxed notion of consent in
enforcing boilerplate text in receipt-like documents such as mailing inserts and confirmations as though the
language had been consciously negotiated by the parties); see also Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks
the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 NEV. L.J. 553 (2012); Linda S. Mullenix, Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of Worst Decisions, 12 NEV. L.J. 549 (2012) (labeling Shute one of
the worst Supreme Court decisions in history); see also Symposium, The Worst Supreme Court Case
Ever?, 12 NEV. L.J. 516 (2012).
10
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2006) (originally enacted in 1925 and effective
January 1, 1926; with only largely minor amendments in 1954, 1970, 1988, 1990, and 2002). The Court in
its decisions often uses the short form of “FAA” for the Act, which is grating and even confusing. At least
prior to the modern era of substantial Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence, the anagram FAA was
synonymous with “Federal Aviation Administration,” and so it will remain in this article, where the Act
will be referred to as the “Act” or the “Federal Arbitration Act”.
11
See e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (discussed infra notes 225260 and accompanying text); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)
(discussed infra notes 206-218 and accompanying text). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love:
Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795 (2012)
(noting that although the Court his almost romantically attached to arbitration as a dispute resolution device
and to the enforcement of mass arbitration clauses, it exhibits opposition to arbitral power should that result
in greater procedural protections for the more disempowered disputant) [hereinafter Tainted Love]. On the
distinction between traditional commercial arbitration and the new “mass” arbitration reflected in
boilerplate arbitration clauses contained on the back of contracts or enclosed with billing statements, see
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383 (2008)
[hereinafter Mandating Minimum Fairness].
12
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed infra notes 190-98 and
accompanying text); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (discussed infra notes
169-78 and accompanying text); see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract
Exclusion in Section I of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary’s Failure of Statutory
Vision, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 253 (1991).
13
See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (discussed infra notes 202-211
and accompanying text). See Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial Review
of Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361 (2010); Richard C. Reuben, Personal
Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Alan Scott Rau, Fear of
Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469 (2006).
14
Which is what the Court (or at least a 5-4 majority) did in Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662. See
discussion infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text.
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Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence is that the more politically, socially, or
economically powerful disputant is more likely to prevail than disputants with
comparatively lower political, social, or economic capital.15
The pro-business, pro-establishment, pro-powerful tendencies of the Rehnquist
and particularly the more conservative Roberts Courts are well chronicled.16 Although I
would prefer a Court (e.g., the Warren Court) that had more pro-underdog tendencies17 or
at least something centrist akin to the Burger Court,18 I realize that victors in political
wars claim legal spoils like judicial appointments just as they are permitted to choose
ambassadors and cabinet members. Republican victories in five of the past nine elections
and the episodic timing of judicial retirements has, along with the increasing
conservatism of Justice Kennedy,19 created the current Roberts Court, generally
considered the most conservative since the early years of the New Deal, 20 and one which

15

See Tainted Love, supra note 11, at 800-03 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s inconsistent
approaches and outcomes can be harmonized only by noting that the Court consistently favors the disputant
with greater social, economic, and political power).
16
See id. at 797, n. 9 (citing commentary on pro-business orientation of the modern Court); see
generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION (2010) (including
pages 227-28, criticism of Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams).
17
The Warren Court was often criticized as resulted-oriented and insufficiently faithful to traditional
legal principles and precedent, largely because of its enlargement of criminal defendant rights and
restrictions on state power, particularly regarding civil rights. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A
Remembrance of Things Past?: Reflections on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055, 1057-58 (2002) (discussing the “ends-justify-the means approach” of the
Warren Court); JOHN DENTON CARTER, THE WARREN COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL VIEW
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1973); ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1968); LOUIS LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME
COURT’S POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION (1975). But as the ensuing four decades have shown,
conservative justices are at least as capable of eschewing precedent and being result-oriented as are liberal
justices.
18
Although more conservative than the Warren Court, the Burger Court was not as dramatically
conservative as some had expected when President Richard Nixon appointed Burger to replace retiring Earl
Warren against the backdrop of Nixon’s strong criticism of the Warren Court during the 1968 presidential
campaign. See VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (1983).
19
See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of
Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737, 757 (2012) (“If,
however, we consider only laws reviewed by the Court since the start of the Roberts Court years, even
Kennedy's ideology shows in his votes—he too is now substantially more likely to strike liberal laws than
conservative laws.”). But see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 2012, at A1 (“[In the 2011-12 term,] [t]he court decided 15 cases by 5-to-4 votes, roughly in line
with earlier terms. . . . What was striking this year was that Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative,
swung right and left an equal number of times. Since 2000, there have been only two terms in which Justice
Kennedy did not vote with the conservatives at least 60 percent of the time in such ideologically divided
cases.”).
20
See CHERMINSKY, supra note 16. The Court of 1932-37, which struck down several New Deal
measures prior to the “switch in time” that “saved nine” in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) rivaled and perhaps exceeded the Roberts Court in conservatism. See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS
115-21 (2011) (describing events of the time). For example, the current Court narrowly upheld the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (in National Fed’n of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012)) while the Court of the 1930s did invalidate several pieces of similar legislation passed by a
Democratic administration. And although the contract jurisprudence of the Roberts Court is quite
conservative, it has not returned to the attitudes of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck

4

seems to have a solid working five-vote majority in favor of compelling arbitration (but
not expansive arbitration unless desired by the more advantaged disputant) on most hotly
contested matters.21
But being a traditionalist, I continue to think of law as capable of producing less
partisan and more logically sound outcomes than legislatures or the executive branch,
even as the membership of the bench and political attitudes may change. On a structural
level, it is of course legitimate to have the Roberts Court in charge. To paraphrase onetime California Senator S.I. Hayakawa on the Panama Canal: “We stole it fair and
square.”22 The election of George W. Bush (the President appointing Justices Roberts
and Alito) was not America’s finest hour due to the controversies and protracted legal
battles surrounding his election, which was effectively decided by a five-member
majority of the Court most closely allied with Bush’s political party. 23 But Bush was
nonetheless President for eight years with the power to appoint whomever he pleased to
the Court, just as the Senate had the prerogative of resisting or confirming.
Regardless of the inevitability of political differences from justice to justice and
Court to Court, one would hope that conservative and liberal justices alike would at least
play within the acknowledged rules of the profession and temper their personal
preferences according to prevailing judicial norms. One norm I advance in this article is
that the Court’s approach to statutory construction should be consistent – at least when
examining a single statute – unless there is a powerful reason to apply different
interpretative methodologies to different sections of the law in question. In other words,
if a one takes a textualist approach to Section X of a statute, it should similarly take a
textualist approach to Section Y. Conversely, if the Court focuses on legislative intent or
other factors when viewing Section X, the same approach should be taken when
addressing Section Y.
But, as outlined below, the Court has tended to shift statutory approaches when
moving from section to section or issue to issue concerning the Federal Arbitration Act.
It has been a “dynamic” interpreter, using approaches generally associated with leftleaning scholars when wishing to encourage arbitration24 while invoking a more

down state regulation on employment conditions as a violation of substantive due process because of
interference with employer-employee “contracting.”
21
See infra notes 129-260 and accompanying text (discussing Court’s arbitration cases).
22
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 270 (Hugh Rawson & Margaret Miner eds.,
2d ed. 2006); James Reston, Panama: What’s the Rush?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1977, at A21.
23
See e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 496-97 (7th ed. 2005) (describing Republican ties of the Bush v.
Gore majority, including possibility that Justice O’Connor may have been interested in Bush’s installation
so that she could retire and have her successor named by a Republican president, although she did not retire
until after Bush was re-elected in 2004). In the accompanying Teacher’s Manual, however, Professor
Gillers rejects all the contentions that Republican-appointed Justices Scalia, Thomas and O’Conner of the
majority should have recused); Mark S. Brodin, Bush v. Gore: The Worst (or at Least Second-to-theWorst) Supreme Court Decision Ever, 12 NEV. L.J. 563 (2012) (deeming the decision one of the Court’s
all-time “worsts” in a symposium on the topic); Christopher Bryant, Haste Makes Waste, NEV. LAWYER,
May 2001, at 18 (criticizing the decision).
24
See infra notes 129-168, 180-189, 199-205, 219-260 and accompanying text (describing Court’s
emphasis on expanding arbitrability in decisions).
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tradition-bound approach to arbitral powers and procedures.25 At this juncture of the
Federal Arbitration Act’s history, there is no realistic possibility of a retrenchment in the
expansive scope of the Act encouraged by the Court since 1984.26 But going forward,
one would hope that the Court would become more consistent in its approach to all
aspects of the Act.
One simple move the Court could make to achieve greater consistency would be
to permit review of arbitration awards more informed by the substantive law governing
the dispute – particularly when the arbitration under review is not the type of commercial
arbitration conducted within an industry or trade as was the case when the law was
enacted in 1925.27 Currently, an arbitration award can be set aside only under fairly
extreme circumstances, such as bias or corruption of an arbitrator.28 But this limited
scope of review came into existence when the typical arbitration involved merchants with
commercial disputes, often merchants that would continue to do business in the future
and operating according to informal norms particular to their lines of work.29 Applied to
that type of traditional arbitration, limited review made sense. But in the more modern
world of mass arbitration that often involves a merchant against a consumer and where
the merchants effectively direct the dispute resolution to an arbitration forum of their
choice, overly deferential review of arbitration awards may impose injustices that the
Congress enacting the Act would not have tolerated.30
My proposal is fairly simple: now that the Court has taken a dynamic and
expansive approach to the Act regarding the imposition of arbitration, it should also apply
a more dynamic and expansive approach to questions of the conduct, scope, and review
25

See infra notes 169-178, 190-198, 206-218 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s more
traditional and limited approach when faced with questions concerning the scope, procedure, or judicial
review of arbitration).
26
See infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text (identifying 1984 decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) as the inauguration of the Court’s modern, largely pro-arbitration
jurisprudence).
27
The Act was passed at the urging of commercial interests, who had grown frustrated with the undue
tendency of some courts to refuse to enforce clearly agreed upon arbitration clauses among merchants on
the ground that such clauses violated public policy by “ousting” the court of jurisdiction. See Larry J.
Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare
Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 799 (2002); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The
Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the
Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 601 (2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 277 (1990).
28
See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (governing vacating of arbitration awards) and § 11 (governing
confirmation of arbitration awards); infra notes 265-268 and accompanying text (describing judicial review
of arbitration awards in more detail).
29
See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1803 (1996); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of
the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 149
(1992).
30
See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (describing background, context and original intent of
the Act as dealing with commercial arbitration among merchants familiar with it and desiring arbitration).
In contrast, modern “mass” arbitration often involves types of claims and litigants not envisioned when the
Act was passed. See Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness, supra note 11, at 396 (separating “old” or
traditional commercial and mercantile arbitration envisioned by the enacting Congress from modern “new”
or “mass” arbitration of consumer or employment disputes made possible since the 1980s because of
Supreme Court’s dynamic expansion of the scope of the Act).
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of the arbitration and its results. Most important, if perhaps controversial, the Court
should revive and expand the “manifest disregard of existing law” ground for vacating or
modifying arbitration awards,31 and treat review of mass arbitration no differently than
review of a trial court decision. This would entail subjecting arbitral fact finding to a
“clearly erroneous” standard of review while reviewing legal decisions not implicitly
intended to be governed by guild or industry norms to at least modest de novo review to
ensure the arbitral tribunal’s correct understanding and application of applicable law.
Part II of this article outlines the major schools of statutory construction. Part III
reviews the Court’s modern arbitration jurisprudence, outlining the Court’s inconsistency
of interpretative approaches in arbitration cases.
Part IV suggests a modernized
alternative approach to the traditional deference accorded to arbitrators in judicial review.
II. METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Even if judges cannot always agree about the precise contours of “the law” by
which we will be ruled, they usually can agree on the rules of the legal process, in
particular approaches to construing statutes, assessing constitutional concerns, stare
decisis, and application of precedent. The legal system embraces a reasonably concrete
set of basic ground rules for statutory construction.32 The Supreme Court Justices
similarly embrace – or at least say that they embrace – these mainstream judicial
approaches.33 Justices in the majority in most of the arbitration cases of the past 30 years
are particularly likely to style themselves as mainstream and resist allegations of judicial
activism,34 although their application of mainstream jurisprudence may often have a
conservative slant in many cases.35
31

See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text (describing the manifest disregard of existing law
ground used by some courts to vacate arbitration awards under some circumstances).
32
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 587-846 (4th ed. 2007)(describing
mainstream approaches to statutory construction based on law’s text, legislative background, purpose, and
function; although different judges attach different weights to these indicia of statutory meaning, almost all
agree that these factors must be examined and fairly applied as part of the process of statutory
construction). See also id. at 847-1100 (discussing widely accepted “Rules, Presumptions and Canons of
Statutory Construction” as well as accepted “Extrinsic Sources for Statutory Interpretation, including
legislative background”).
33
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, Appendix B (citing Court decisions in which basic
mainstream rules of statutory construction, including use of canons of meaning and construction are
regularly invoked); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184-85 (1989) (expressing support for strict textual reading of law, following established doctrine, and
deferring to original understanding of laws) [hereinafter Rule of Law]; Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative
History, supra note 7; Breyer, Judicial Review, supra note 7. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW
JUDGES THINK Chs. 1-4 (2008) (expressing very legal realist view of the judicial process that includes a
chapter devoted to “The Supreme Court as a Political Court” but nonetheless also observing widespread
judicial embrace of mainstream legal principles and strong tendency of jurists to wish to be perceived as
fair-minded, mainstream, and not excessively political, partisan, or result-oriented).
34
TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 358-61, 380-432
(2001) (discussing backgrounds and professional and public view of mainstream judicial approaches, of
Justices, William Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, Warren E. Burger, Harry
Blackmun, Lewis Powell, William Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, all Justices
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This judicial center of gravity seems particularly well established in matters of
statutory interpretation. Although the Court’s major arbitration cases present a range of
legal questions, all are in the main statutory construction cases focusing on the proper
application of the Federal Arbitration Act, sometimes alone or sometimes in combination
or arguable conflict with other statutes. Regarding statutory construction, the Supreme
Court during the same period that it has longingly embraced arbitration, has also
professed fidelity to a statutory construction regime emphasizing the following
interpretative tools.
A. Statutory Text
Mainstream legal thought places substantial emphasis on statutory text and the
Court has repeatedly stated that the starting point for assessing a statute such as the
Federal Arbitration Act is its text.36 Justice Antonin Scalia is famous for his heavily
textualist brand of statutory construction that looks almost exclusively at the text of the
statute and eschews examination of the legislative history of the law or its overall
purpose.37 But even non-textualists such as Justice Stephen Breyer (a comparative fan of
participating in the Court’s modern arbitration decisions during the period from 1980 to the present). I am
not naively suggesting that there are no significant jurisprudential differences between the Justices. On the
contrary, some are distinctly more liberal or more conservative, more formalist or functionalist, more
textual or more contextual than others. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A
HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II (5th ed. 2008)
(providing a particularly candid and realistic history of the degree to which ideological, jurisprudential,
political and even partisan factors played a role in the appointment and confirmation process). But
notwithstanding the very real differences between the Justices, a review of their backgrounds demonstrates
that all qualify as “mainstream” judicial actors in that they purport to agree on basic premises of the legal
process and do not espouse “impermissible” views that would have threatened or precluded nomination and
confirmation.
35
I am thinking in particular of Justices such as Warren Burger, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter, and even Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, and Samuel Alito. All of these Justices are generally characterized as judicial conservatives,
particularly the latter four. See ABRAHAM, supra note 34, Chs. 11-13; HALL, supra note 34, at 384-423.
But none are described as so conservative as to fall outside the judicial mainstream or accused of espousing
views inconsistent with the basic legal canon. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16 (suggesting that in
practice and application, the current conservative Justices are rendering decisions inconsistent with the
Constitution).
36
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 765-98, App. B, p. 19; WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS Ch. 5 (5th ed. 2009); REED DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975). See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.
84 (1985) (reading text of statute requiring filing “prior to December 31” literally to rule invalid a filing
made on December 31); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (reading text of statute
literally to calculate penalty for failure to pay wages to seaman). Regarding textualism and arbitration ,
see, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (placing prominence on the text in
construing §§ 9-11 of the Act, noting that the Act has textual features in conflict with enforcement of a
contract to expand judicial review of arbitration results); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665,
672 (2012) (“Had Congress meant to prohibit these very common provisions in the CROA, it would have
done so in a manner less obtuse than what respondents suggest. When it has restricted the use of arbitration
in other contexts, it has done so with a clarity that far exceeds the claimed indications in the CROA.”).
37
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 765-66; POPKIN, supra note 36, at ch. 5 (providing general
overview of problems with overly textualist view and noting leavening doctrines such as the Whole Act
Rule and canon against overly literal construction that give an absurd result); William Eskridge, Jr., The
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legislative history and deferring to agency constructions of a statute) 38 agree that the text
of the law is the most important consideration and the place at which statutory
construction must begin.39 Chief Justice Roberts (and Chief Justices William Rehnquist
and Warren Burger before him) and the other Justices of the current Court all appear to
agree on the importance of text, with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito appearing
closer to Justice Scalia’s more textual orientation. Other Justices serving during the
modern pro-arbitration era of the Court (Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and
Souter) also reflected the legal profession’s general preference for the primacy of text in
statutory construction, even if the primacy is at times a “soft” one for some Justices. But
overall, the Court as a whole historically has tended to operate in a pragmatic, largely
centrist manner without undue emphasis on any particular method of statutory
interpretation.40
B. Legislative Intent
All members of the Court during the modern pro-arbitration era, except Justice
Scalia, acknowledge that the drafting history and legislative intent of a statute are
relevant to determining the meaning and application of a statute in particular contexts.41
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Nicholas Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism and the
“New” New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L REV. 1597 (1992). See also Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall
of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 33.
38
See Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 7 (defending legitimacy of legislative
intent as interpretative tool); see also ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 955-56, 971-73 (noting
acceptance of legislative background and other extrinsic information as tools of statutory construction);
ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 990 n. j (collecting substantial academic commentary supporting
Justice Breyer’s attitude toward legislative history as mainstream view but also collecting scholarship
reflecting substantial support for Scalia perspective); POPKIN, supra note 36, at chs. 2 - 5 (noting that for
most of legal history legislative intent or purpose was seen as the touchstone of statutory construction and
even more salient that statutory text but that text has attained more prominence in modern statutory
construction theory). See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (codifying view that legislative intent “controls”
judicial construction of stator meaning: “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.”).
39
See, e.g., U.S. v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011).
40
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) [hereinafter Practical Reasoning].
41
See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 599 U.S. 120 (2000) (utilizing legislative
history in Justice O’Connor majority opinion; opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas); Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989) (Justice White in majority opinion invokes legislative history); compare
Kosak v. U.S., 465 U.S. 848 (1984) (utilizing legislative history in Justice Marshall’s opinion for the
Court), with Kosak, 465 U.S. at 862-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (utilizing the textualist approach); see also
Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (considering legislative background of statute and IRS
regulation, including congressional failure to respond negatively to agency regulation); Leo Sheep Co. v.
U.S., 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (relying heavily on legislative background and perceived intent and purpose of
Congress that passed the Union Pacific Act of 1862). See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 117, 122 (2008) (finding that both liberal and conservative justices make frequent resort to
legislative history); Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (noting widespread acceptance of legislative
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The Justices vary to the degree with which they will end their inquiry if the text appears
to direct a result. Some appear to see legislative history as inappropriate unless the
statutory text is ambiguous while others appear willing to consult legislative history as a
check on their reading of the text. The Justices also frequently differ, of course, as to
whether particular language is ambiguous.42
C. Legislative Purpose
Legislative intent connotes a relatively specific intent of the legislature to achieve
a particular result or that statutory language be applied in a rather specific way in a
situation envisioned by the drafters. Legislative purpose connotes more general goals of
the statute.43 For example, where the legislative history reflects congressional consensus
that particular legal precedents be overturned, this is a matter of legislative intent. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,44 for example, was designed specifically to overrule the
Court’s 1976 General Electric v. Gilbert decision and deem pregnancy discrimination a
violation of Title VII.45
Where, by contrast, the legislative history reflects more general congressional
desire to achieve certain results to prevent or discourage undesirable results, this is a
matter of legislative purpose. For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 199546 was designed to make it more difficult to bring securities violation lawsuits on
the basis of hunch and therefore required more particularized pleadings. But the statute
did not specifically state whether the specified pleading standards found in case law
applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) were adequate.47 Based on the legislative purpose of the
law and its enactment notwithstanding the existence of Rule 9(b), a judge might view the
history as interpretative tool but contending that the Court has not been following “consistent and uniform
rules of for statutory construction and use of legislative materials.”); but see ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note
32, at 987-90 (noting Justice Scalia’s opposition to use of legislative history).
42
See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (Court divides over whether statutory text
empowers agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions); U.S. v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (Court divides
over proper application of seemingly clear but odd filing deadline of “prior to December 31” contained in
statute); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (Court divides over whether legislation
setting statutory right of recovery has implicit end point or should be interpreted literally to allow damages
to continue accruing). See also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (Court
relatively in agreement over meaning of text of statute but differing over whether literal application would
produce absurd result and whether in such circumstances clear text may be disregarded).
43
See POPKIN, supra note 36, at § 6.02 (noting distinction between legislative intent as something
specifically sought by enacting legislature and legislative purpose as more generalized goals of legislation).
44
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (2006).
45
In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court found that pregnancy discrimination
by an employer did not violate Title VII because – I am not making this up – only women get pregnant
(some Court decisions are even worse than the current Court’s arbitration jurisprudence). Congress reacted
by passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which made pregnancy discrimination an express violation
of Title VII. See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009) (noting current statutory provision).
46
See 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006) (codification of pleading standards of Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995).
47
See Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2001); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000);
Marc. I. Steinberg & Diego E. Gomez-Cornejo, Blurring the Lines Between Pleading Doctrines: The
Enhanced Rule 8(a)(2) Plausibility Pleading Standard Converges with the Heightened Fraud Pleading
Standards Under Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA, 30 REV. LITIG. 1, 16-25 (2010).
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legislative purpose as requiring a more particularized pleading than found under the Rule
in cases subject to the Act. Conversely, a judge might find congressional silence on the
issue an indication that Congress, despite its general concern over weak securities claims
filed on a hunch, was simply wanting something more than mere notice pleading and
wider application of cases taking a strong view of Rule 9(b).48
Another example is provided by the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, 49 which
were both designed to fight monopolization and to forbid contracts, combinations and
conspiracies in restraint of trade – but Congress was relatively vague about how that
should be done. Although there is some legislative history suggesting that the laws were
designed to prevent specific behemoths such as the Sugar Trust or the domination of the
oil industry reflected by John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company (prior to its
becoming Amoco, Esso, Enco, etc.), the statutes are in the main laws expressing general
purposive guidelines. As a result, the courts have tended to apply “rules of reason” rather
than per se rules in many cases challenging alleged anti-competitive conduct.50 Judge
Posner has characterized the Sherman Act as something of a common law statute, one
that seems to invite judicial application because of the absence of specific directives in
the law’s text or legislative history.51
In its use of legislative purpose in construing the antitrust laws, the Court has used
legislative purpose to trump the actual text of the law. For example, if the Sherman Act
were read literality and applied to “any” contract restraining trade, 52 franchises and
licenses would be forbidden because this is both the literal language of the statute and
because all contracts by definition constrain the contracting parties to at least some
degree in that as a result of the contract, they are obligated to perform or pay damages.53
This view can also be considered akin to the “absurd result” canon of statutory

48

Justice Stevens was perhaps the best known exponent of what is sometimes called the “dog didn’t
bark” approach to statutory construction. Under this view, congressional silence can be regarded as
meaningful and frequently is invoked to suggest that a newly enacted statute was not designed to overturn
an established practice touching on the area of statutory concern. If Congress had wanted to make a
change, it logically would have said so on the face of the statute or in the legislative history. That Congress
did not speak implies it intended no such change. See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 1035. The
metaphor is taken from the Sherlock Holmes story involving the theft of a prize racehorse at night from the
stable in which the family dog did not bark despite this burglary. Holmes correctly discerns that the thief
must have been someone well-enough known to the dog such that the animal was not alarmed enough to
bark. See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES (various editions and
dates).
49
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (2006).
50
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE § 6.4 (4th ed. 2011); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 39-40 (2d ed. 2011); JULIAN O. VON
KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.01(2)(b) (2d ed. 1999).
51
See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 212 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Formalism]; Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983)
[hereinafter Statutory Interpretation].
52
The Sherman Act states that “any contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade” is
illegal. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
53
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAURENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS:
CONTRACTS IN CONTEXT 711-13 (3d ed. 2011).
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construction, a principle positing that statutory text will not be applied so literally as to
render an absurd result.54
D. The Hierarchy of Legislative History
Not all legislative history is created equal but jurists tend to agree on the relative
authority and persuasiveness of different forms of legislative history. In general, there is
a preference, in roughly the following order for: committee reports;55 statements by the
chief authors of the legislation; constructions consistent with hearing testimony and
congressional reaction; floor statements; and contemporary accounts of enactment of the
legislation.56
E. Canons of Construction
Canons of statutory construction are general rules for interpreting the laws and are
derived from common understandings of drafting conventions, the legislative process,
public policy, or jurisprudence. Although varying in their affection for particular canons,
all of the Justices appear to find them potentially useful in particular situations.57 Both
textualists and others invoke canons of textual construction that provide presumptions as
to the interpretation of words in a statute.58 Examples are the plain meaning rule59 and
Latin maxims such as nocitur a sociis60 and ejusdem generis61 as well as preference for

54

See U.S. v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) (applying absurd result exception to general rule of
applying “plain” textual meaning of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11
(1989).
55
See Jorge Carro & Andrew Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A
Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 (1982) (over forty year period, more than 60 percent of
Court’s citations to legislative history were to committee reports). See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 75, n. 7 (1984) (relying on Senate report regarding civil rights bill that was not even enacted
but was similar to that enacted in law).
56
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 971-1065; POPKIN, supra note 36, at chs. 6, 9-11. See also
OTTO HETZEL, MICHAEL LIBONATI & ROBERT WILLIAMS, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 589 (3d ed.
2001) (providing extensive list of 20 different forms of legislative background information that courts may
use).
57
This discussion of canons of construction is drawn largely from Appendix B to ESKRIDGE, ET AL.,
supra note 32, which presents an exhaustive review of the canons; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note
6.
58
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 19-23 (providing examples of canons regarding
presumptions as to word meaning); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6, at 69-239.
59
This requires adherence to the clear linguistic meaning of statutory text unless this would bring
about an absurd result or there is evidence that the text is in error in departing from the specific intent of the
legislature. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-35 (2007); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S.
20, 26-29 (2003); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 19.
60
This maxim provides that a general term is construed in a manner consistent with similar specific
terms in a statute. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note
32, app. B at 20.
61
A general term is construed to reflect the class of objects shown in exemplary or specific terms used
in the statute. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (discussed infra note 190-198
and accompanying text; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 20).
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ordinary meaning rather than technical or specialist meaning62 and use of dictionary
definitions63 or resort to the default definitions of terms set forth in the Rules of
Construction Act, 1 U.S.C. §1 if available.64 There are also a number of grammar and
syntax canons regarding punctuation, grammar, the “rule of the last antecedent,” and the
understanding largely shared with laypersons that “may” implies discretion while “shall”
implies that something is mandatory or less discretionary while “or” means in the
alternative and is disjunctive rather than conjunctive.65
In addition, there are widely accepted canons regarding what might be termed the
structural assessments of a statute.66 There is also widespread judicial agreement tending
to embrace canons “expressing a preference for continuity in law.”67 Among these are a
presumption of stare decisis but acceptance that wrongly decided precedents can be
overruled where the case for change is sufficiently compelling.68 In addition, there is a
presumption against repeals by implication69 and a presumption that statutory terms are
used consistently across statutes.70 Related to this is the in pari materia rule providing
that the use of similar statutory provisions in comparable statutes will be applied in the
same way.71 There is also a judicial consensus that the views of a later Congress are
generally not seen as illuminating the views of an enacting Congress.72
There are also a number of canons reflecting substantive policy generally
embraced by the courts. Despite the legal realist truth that judges can differ considerably
in their personal preferences, the bench as a group appears to accept a basic core of
substantive legal, political, and social values as well as adherence to governing
procedural rules. For example, a leading casebook divides these canons into several
groups: federalism canons, due process and common law based canons.73

62

Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32,
app. B at 20.
63
Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113 (1988); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at
20.
64
See Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005); ESKRIDGE, ET AL ., supra note 32, app. B at
21.
65
Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005) (“may” implies discretion);
Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 320 (2001); Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 302 (1989) (“shall” implies a
command); Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1993) (rule of the last antecedent);
ESKRIDGE, ET Al., supra note 32, app. B at 21.
66
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at app. B. at 21; Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 11, at 81415.
67
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B. at 25-26.
68
See id.
69
See id. at 26; Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
70
See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 26.
71
See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640-43 (2007) (ironic in that,
Ledbetter was legislatively overruled in 2009 because of a widespread perception that the Court’s holding
was in error; the in pari materia canon, however, is widely followed by both liberals and conservatives,
although they may of course differ in its application); ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 26.
72
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, app. B at 28.
73
See id. at 29-31.
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F. More Controversial Approaches to Statutory Construction
The mainstream approach to statutory construction embraced by the Justices
generally begins with and emphasizes text but also considers legislative intent and
purpose to the degree appropriate so long as it does not strain the reading of the text. The
Court as a whole has been less willing or perhaps even unwilling to endorse some of the
less established modes of statutory interpretation, which enjoy significant support in the
academy. Among these are considerations of public policy, appreciation of the interest
group influence in legislation, and the view that construction of legislation should evolve
with changing circumstances.74 In practice, however, it appears that courts use a variety
of approaches that permit courts more ability to exercise personal preferences than courts
are willing to acknowledge.75 In addition, there are questions of the role of the executive
branch and administrative agencies in the construction of statutes.76
Quite controversial are dynamic or evolutionary approaches to statutory
construction. Under this approach, most associated with Professor William Eskridge,77
reviewing courts are empowered to update legislation to fit current applications so long
as sufficiently consistent with the language of the statute and the goals of the enacting
legislature. In other words, the court can modernize the statute to address unanticipated
problems or results in the field at odds with the goals of the legislation.78
For example, a dynamic statutory interpreter would approve of a decision such as
Griggs v. Duke Power,79 in which the Burger Court concluded that job discrimination
claims made pursuant the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be proven, at least as a prima
facie matter, even without evidence of intentional discrimination (“disparate treatment”)
in cases where the defendant employer had a facially neutral policy that caused a racially

74

See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1997) (arguing that
construction of statutes should evolve in manner consistent with purposes of enacting legislature to fit
changes in society, economics, business); CALABRESI, supra note 2 (suggesting that older statutes should be
treated like common law precedents that can, in compelling cases, be “overruled” by courts). See also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989) (public
policy considerations frequently if tacitly used by courts in deciding cases; finding such use appropriate and
legitimate but questioning particular values emphasized in certain decisions); Richard Stewart, The
Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (noting rising interest group influence
on modern legislation and administrative agency action but diffuse as to recommended reaction). See
generally ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at chs. 6-8 (reviewing approaches to statutory construction).
75
See Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 40.
76
See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
77
See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); see
also William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); William N. Eskridge, All
About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Law as Equilibrium,
108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994) (arguing for inclusion of dynamic perspective as component of more
pragmatic, mainstream approaches to statutory construction).
78
See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 74; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra
note 32, at 749; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21
(1988) (arguing for dynamic statutory construction but labeling it as a “nautical” model in which the
legislature sets the statute on a voyage that must be completed by courts construing the law).
79
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1972).

14

“disparate impact.”80 The Court was in effect updating the statute (a mere eight years
after its passage) to account for the difficulty of proving discrimination once employers
were on notice that announced intentional discrimination violated the law.
Similarly, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,81 the Court took a
dynamic approach in concluding that affirmative action policies favoring minority
workers did not violate the nondiscrimination principle of Title VII through reversediscrimination.82 The statute, which had been passed 15 years earlier, was largely silent
on the issue. The Court in essence reasoned that effective implication of the law would
under some circumstances require remedial relief that included affirmative action
efforts.83
More controversial than dynamic statutory interpretation is the view that older
statutes should be treated akin to common law in that a modern court can feel empowered
to apply a construction of the statute that fits the current legal landscape even if this is far
afield from the literal text of the law or the enacting legislature’s specific intent or
general purpose. This approach is most associated with Guido Calabresi’s A Common
Law for the Age of Statutes, in which then-Professor Calabresi defended the view84 well
enough that the book received the American Association of Law Schools triennial Coif
Award.85 Nonetheless, the book and the school of thought became a lightning rod for
critics contending that the common law approach to statutory construction was
insufficiently appreciative of the limits of judicial power and the American approach to
separation of powers.86
Evolutionary approaches to statutory construction such as dynamic statutory
interpretation or a common law approach are seldom directly addressed in judicial
opinions and are, at least in official parlance, not mainstream schools of statutory
construction. In practice, however, courts may use them sub silentio to aid in reaching a
decision where the resolution of the issue is not dictated by statutory text, specific
legislative intent, or clearly discernable legislative purpose whose application to the
instant case is fairly clear.

80

See id. at 427-35; ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 82-87. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,
CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SHROEDER & ELAINE W. SHOBEN, EMPLOYMENT LAW Ch. 2 (4th ed. 2009)
(reviewing employment discrimination law and Title VII).
81
See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
82
See id. at 198-209.
83
See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 32, at 100-04; ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
supra note 74, at 24-25.
84
See CALABRESI, supra note 2.
85
See Otto J. Hetzel, Instilling Legislative Interpretation Skills in the Classroom and the Courtroom,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 663, 667 n.14 (1987).
86
See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan, Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1982); Grover Rees III, Cathedrals Without Walls: A View from the Outside, 61
TEX. L. REV. 347 (1982); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation,
78 GEO. L.J. 353, 357 n.22 (1989) (citing additional articles critical of the book). However, other authorities
have found the common law approach one worth exploring. See, e.g., Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory
Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979) (law professor and state
legislator argues in favor of statute essentially adopting a common law approach similar to Calabresi’s for
statutes more than 25 years old). See also JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL
(3d ed. 2007).
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Because of the outsider status of dynamic/common law statutory construction, it
is more than a bit surprising to see it applied to questions of arbitrability by three
successive courts (the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts) generally regarded as
conservative. Their predecessor, the Warren Court, generally regarded as one of the most
liberal in American history, tended toward an originalist view that was sometimes wary
of arbitration and hesitant to construe the Federal Arbitration Act in a manner that would
open up wide areas of dispute to mass arbitration.87 But, as discussed below, the Court
since the 1980s has been engaged in a dynamic interpretative enterprise that has
expanded the scope of the Act substantially beyond what was originally intended.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND ARBITRATION: PROMOTION BUT INCONSISTENCY
A. Pre-Act History
The Court (and courts generally) were not always proponents of arbitration.
Indeed, the Act was prompted in large part by the business community’s dismay over
such decisions and its persuasion of Congress that legislative overruling of antiarbitration decisions was in order.88 A personal favorite illustration of pre-Act judicial
hostility to arbitration is Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten v. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og
Foderstof Kompagniet, (often also known at The Atlanten or Korn-Og, the latter my
preference).89 In this case decided shortly before enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act, the Court, (affirming a Learned Hand trial court decision and a Second Circuit
decision) held that even what appears to be a broadly worded arbitration clause in a
shipping contract between merchants (with no discernable issues of consumer protection,
consent, etc.) does not require arbitration.90 The reason: because one party sought to
arbitrate an issue of breach of contract, the arbitration clause was inapplicable because
the claim did not arise out of the performance of the contract because the contract was not
being performed due to the breach.91

87

See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TULANE L. REV. 1377
(1991) (reviewing decisions on arbitration frequently showing Warren Court resistant to expansive
statutory construction and favoring a more traditionalist, less dynamic, approach).
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B. The Federal Arbitration Act
Cases like Korn-Og were not that unusual. English courts resisted specific
enforcement of arbitration clauses on the ground that these improperly ousted courts of
their rightful jurisdiction, a view that was largely adopted in the United States. In
reaction, the commercial community sought corrective legislation and obtained it with
passage of the Act, now codified at 9 U.S.C. §§1-16.92
The Act itself, passed in 1925 with an effective date of January 1, 1926 (9 U.S.C.
§14), is rather short and straight-forward. After defining key terms such as “commerce”
and “maritime,” the Act states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.93
Section 3 of the statute (9 U.S.C. §3) provides that courts may issue a stay of
judicial proceedings in order to permit arbitration to proceed pursuant to an enforceable
agreement. Section 4 (9 U.S.C. §4) gives federal courts authority to enter an order
compelling arbitration if the petitioning party to a valid arbitration agreement is
“aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate.” Several
sections of the Act deal with procedural matters. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §5 (governing the
appointment of arbitrators); 9 U.S.C. §6 (providing that applications for relief are treated
as motions; 9 U.S.C. §7 (governing witnesses, fees, and subpoenas); 9 U.S.C. §8
(governing admiralty matters such as seizure of vessels); 9 U.S.C. §11 (regulating
modification and correction of errors in an arbitration award); 9 U.S.C. §13 (governing
papers and docketing); and 9 U.S.C. §15 (inapplicability of the “Act of State” doctrine).
The Act provides strong support for enforcing arbitration awards, specifying that
federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment based on the award (9 U.S.C. §9),
which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party the normal range of judgment
collection tools under applicable procedural law. Section 10 of the Act (9 U.S.C. §10)
permits arbitration awards to be challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower than
those available in litigation, specifically:
• where the award was “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means”;
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• where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
• where the arbitrators erred by refusing to delay a hearing for good cause
or to hear “pertinent and material evidence” or where there was “any other
misbehavior” prejudicing the rights of the parties; or
• where the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their power in light of the
matter submitted to them or “so imperfectly” executed their power “that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made;”94
The final section of the Act (9 U.S.C. §16) governs appeals and reflects
congressional preference (largely through 1990 amendments rather than the original 1925
enactment) to reduce appellate challenge to pro-arbitration orders95 but permit appellate
review of orders refusing to compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings
pending arbitration.
C. The First Five Decades of Construing the Arbitration Act
Despite passage of the Act, there remained some judicial resistance to arbitration,
as occasionally reflected in case law over the next 50 years. Most prominent was Wilko
v. Swan,96 which held – seemingly out of the blue – that claims arising under the
Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to arbitration, regardless of the clarity of the
arbitration clause, the knowing and voluntary consent of the parties, the standard practice
of the industry, or the expectations of the parties.
In a similar vein was Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,97 which the Court
implicitly revisited and reversed in the watershed Southland Corp. v. Keating98 decision.
The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act was procedural rather than substantive
and consequently was subject to the Erie doctrine, which made Vermont law applicable
in the instant case. Under Vermont law, arbitration agreements of this type were
unenforceable. Hence, arbitration was not required regardless of the surrounding
contracting circumstances.99
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The Court took a more receptive approach to arbitration in the context of labor
arbitration in the “Steelworkers Trilogy,” three cases involving disputes between the then
powerful United Steelworkers of America union and companies with which it had
collective bargaining agreements providing for arbitration of workplace disputes.100
Some argue that these cases – rather than the Court’s 1980s cases promoting arbitration –
comprise the inauguration of the modern era of Supreme Court precedent favoring
arbitration.101 In American Mfg. and Warrior & Gulf, the Court enforced arbitration
agreements.102 In Enterprise Wheel & Car, the Court announced a very deferential
standard for the review of labor arbitration decisions, holding that the decision would be
confirmed by courts so long as the arbitrator’s decision “drew its essence” from the
agreement.103 A cynic might note that even a horribly erroneous decision can still be one
dealing with the essence or core of the agreement giving rise to the dispute.
Because these three cases were so focused on labor arbitration rather than
commercial or consumer arbitration, I consider them to be precursors to the modern era.
To be sure, the Court is showing signs of greater affection for arbitration but this results
largely from the Court’s view that arbitration is a particularly critical component of the
collective bargaining process and an established means by which labor peace is
preserved. As the Court’s other 1960s and 1970s cases show, the Court was warming to
arbitration but continued to have doubts about it outside the labor arena.
In Moseley v. Electronic Missile Facilities, Inc.,104 a plumbing/heating
subcontractor filed suit in Georgia to collect funds allegedly owed to it by the general
contractor for a United States government missile site and successfully resisted
arbitration even though the contractor had previously filed an action in New York
seeking to enforce the arbitration clause. The Court found that the subcontractor had
adequately alleged an issue regarding possible fraud regarding the procurement of the
arbitration agreement.105 This seems a relatively classic case of what I have termed “old”
or traditional commercial arbitration rather than the “new” or “mass” arbitration of retail
100
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consumer matters that has troubled many.106 However, one might argue that the terms of
the arbitration agreement unfairly subjected the subcontractor to a seriously inconvenient
forum.107
Notwithstanding the Steelworkers Trilogy, Moseley suggested continuing
wariness toward arbitration by the court.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,108 the Court held (arguably
overruling Moseley) that a question of fraudulent inducement into the contract containing
an arbitration clause was in first instance a question for the arbitrator. By giving
arbitrators “first dibs” on these questions, the Court appeared to move toward a more
favorable attitude toward arbitration.109 Continuing this substantial deference to private
dispute resolution agreements, the Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,110
enforced a forum selection clause in a maritime towing agreement, even though the party
adhering to the towing contract had relatively little bargaining power in light of the
disabled condition of its vessel.111 The case was regarded as a sign that the Court was
beginning to look more favorably on such agreements.112 Logically, this suggested
similarly more favorable attitudes toward arbitration agreements. But The Bremen was a
case of traditional commercial arbitration rather than of new mass arbitration affecting
consumers.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware,113 involved a dispute over
wage claims. The Court refused to enforce the standard arbitration clause signed by
workers in the financial services industry as a condition of their employment because of a
state law prohibiting arbitration of wage claims. Although this decision is now
effectively overruled by Southland and its progeny114 the latter cases are arguably
distinguishable in that the state law in Ware appears more directly aimed against
arbitration while the state law in Southland was made inapplicable to any contract
provisions waiving substantive rights as a condition of obtaining a franchise. However,
in view of the Court’s most recent arbitration decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, which
refused to apply state contract law to arbitration agreements despite the language of the
Federal Arbitration Act inviting its application,115 Ware is effectively dead (absent a
change in Court composition and a willingness to re-examine the issue) and represents
the Court’s old skeptical concern about arbitration rather than its newfound affection for
arbitration.116
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A year after Ware, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,117 the Court enforced an
arbitration clause – one calling for arbitration in France – contained in a sale-of-business
agreement between a businessperson and a large multinational company. Although
traveling to Paris is hardly the greatest dispute resolution burden one might face, the
Court’s enforcement reflects its general comfort with arbitration, at least in the
commercial context. But, as in The Bremen, the Court was dealing with old style
commercial arbitration and not the new mass arbitration of consumer complaints that
would arise as a consequence of the Court’s later pro-arbitration jurisprudence. Even so,
scholarly discussion of the decision expressed concern that the franchisee dealing with
the manufacturer might lack sufficient independence, savvy, and bargaining power as
well as expressing concern that the language and reasoning of Scherk could lead to more
aggressive enforcement of arbitration clauses contained on consumer contracts.118
As of the mid-1970s, then, the Court’s approach could be characterized as one of
greater acceptance of arbitration but with some continuing concern or even outright
hostility when arbitration clauses swept within their textual ambit statutory claims. For
example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,119 the Title VII claim of a union
employee was held to be beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the
collective bargaining agreement to which he was subject. Although the decision can be
fairly regarded as one merely interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause and the
nature of union-management dispute resolution as opposed to a civil rights claim, the
decision can also be read as one applying a statutory or public policy exception to the
Federal Arbitration Act.120 In any event, Gardner-Denver suggested that the Court
remained at least mildly skeptical about arbitration in some contexts.
For example, in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,121 the Court
held that a broadly worked arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not
apply to the worker’s Fair Labor Standards Act Claims. The case stands pretty clearly as
a case applying a “statutory” claims exception to arbitration in the manner of Wilko v.
Swan. The Court, although not overtly hostile to arbitration, continued to limit its reach
and deny arbitrability for certain types of cases.122 In McDonald v. City of West
Branch,123 in a fashion quite similar to Barrentine, the Court refused to compel
arbitration of civil rights claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, suggesting that the
Court is not yet in full embrace of arbitration as a concept.124
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But within a short time after McDonald v. West Branch, the Court’s affection for
arbitration solidified. Despite 1980s cases such as Barrentine and West Branch that
reflected continued wariness about arbitration, the Court by the mid-1980s had embarked
on a new path. Decided during the same term as West Branch, Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp.,125 enforced an arbitration agreement in a dispute
over a construction project between the buyer hospital and the general contractor. The
hospital sought a state court order staying arbitration proceedings notwithstanding that
the construction contract, like most such contracts, contained a broadly worded
arbitration clause committing such contract-related disputes to arbitration.
The Court’s decision compelling arbitration and rejecting the view that “Colorado
River” abstention126 by the federal court was required by notions of deference to ongoing
state proceedings127 made eminent sense. In dissent, however, Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor argued that in its zeal to render the pro-arbitration
ruling, the majority had been too quick to find a sufficiently final order that permitted
appeal.128 Legal realists might also note with some irony that in Moses H. Cone, it was
three of the Court’s Republican-appointed conservatives who had misgivings about the
pro-arbitration result – exactly the opposite of the situation tending to obtain in the
current Court.
What prompts some to see Moses H. Cone as the dawn of the modern proarbitration era is its rhetoric favoring arbitration.129 More substantively, the Moses H.
Cone majority states that the Act “create[s] a substantive law of arbitrability applicable to
any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”130 In other words, the Act
would appear to apply in state courts as well as in federal court. But this issue was not
prominently addressed until the Court’s next important arbitration case. Although the
Moses H. Cone decision favored arbitration, it was not the full-fledged embrace that
came in Southland Corp. v. Keating,131 which most regard as the dawn of the Court’s
modern pro-arbitration jurisprudence.
Southland involved a dispute between the convenience store chain 7-Eleven and a
California franchisee. The franchise agreement contained a broadly worded arbitration
clause the franchisor sought to enforce to compel arbitration of the dispute. The
franchisee resisted, citing as support a portion of the state’s franchise law that forbade
125
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enforcement of waivers of franchisee rights. The California Supreme Court reasoned that
an arbitration clause was in effect a waiver of the franchisee’s right to seek judicial relief
in the event of a controversy over the franchise agreement. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed.132
Southland thus presented in starker relief than Moses H. Cone the issue of
whether the Federal Arbitration Act was substantive federal law that took precedence
over contrary state law. The Supreme Court could not alter the construction of a state
statute declared by the state’s highest court, even if it found the reasoning (that agreement
to arbitration was a sufficient waiver of substantive rights to be forbidden under state
franchise law) flawed. If the decision was to be reversed, it had to be because the state
law was powerless against a federal law commanding arbitration – and the Southland
Court so found, over the dissents of Justice Stevens133 and Justice O’Connor (joined by
Justice Rehnquist).134
Southland, authored by Chief Justice Burger, who had been promoting alternative
dispute resolution from the bully pulpit of the Chief’s office, also appears to mark the
beginning of an ideological shift in that Republican and conservative Justices that might
otherwise have opposed broad arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and states’
rights grounds began to become arbitration advocates notwithstanding the powerful pull
these concepts normally exert over Republicans and conservatives. Justice Rehnquist
would soon be largely supporting outcomes favorable to arbitration. Although Justice
O’Conner continued to express opposition to the nationalization of the Federal
Arbitration Act by making it substantive law and was later joined by Justice Thomas,
there are today no Republican-appointed Justices opposing arbitrability in close cases.135
The Southland majority embraced the now-modern view of the Act as federal
substantive law, bootstrapping in part on the passing statement to that effect in Justice
Brennan’s Moses H. Cone opinion.136 Although acknowledging that “the legislative
history [of the Act] is not without ambiguities,” the Court found that “there are strong
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration
agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”137 The Court further found that “[i]n
creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended
to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.”138 Thus, the Court held “that § 31512 of the California Franchise
Investment Law violated the Supremacy Clause” as well as being inconsistent with the
Federal Arbitration Act.139
Rightly or wrongly, Southland is an example of dynamic or evolutionary statutory
construction in that the majority is expanding the reach of the statute beyond the specific
intent of the enacting Congress and perhaps beyond the basic purpose of the statute as
132
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well, although the Southland result can be defended in part on broad legislative grounds
(i.e., general congressional support for arbitration). But in its sub silentio dynamism, the
Southland majority arguably overreads the text of the Act and clearly minimizes or even
ignores traditional mainstream concerns of federalism, historical practice, restraint in
expanding congressional power absent a clear statement, and deference to traditional state
prerogatives.
Although the majority has a plausible textual construction of the Act, it can also
be argued that the Act’s language stating that arbitration agreements may be avoided on
“grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” (9 U.S.C. §2)
includes illegality under applicable state law such as the California Franchise Investment
Act. Although it would not be well articulated for another decade or so, a natural reading
of this language also clearly encompasses state contract law concepts such as fraud,
misrepresentation, and unconscionability (both procedural and substantive) that can
support setting aside contract terms such as arbitration clauses if they are deemed
sufficiently oppressive.
The majority also has a plausible view of the legislative history. But Justice
O’Connor’s dissent is much more thorough in its exploration of legislative history and
quite convincing in its argument that the Act was always intended by Congress only to
apply to federal court proceedings, which were at the time the proceedings about which
the commercial proponents of the Act were concerned.140 In an important illumination of
the result-orientation of the Southland majority, the O’Connor dissent notes that
Southland is effectively overruling Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,141 which had viewed
the Federal Arbitration Act as procedural and thus applied Erie v. Tompkins,142 to require
that the validity and enforceability of an arbitration clause litigated in Vermont state court
be decided by Vermont law. But the Southland majority does not even cite Bernhardt,
let alone address it and explain why its reasoning some 30 years ago (and much closer to
the time the Act was passed) is in error.
This failing suggests the Southland majority may have been excessively intent on
expanding the Act and embracing arbitration on personal preference grounds rather than
giving the issue the careful reading of precedent it deserved. Even if one agrees with the
Southland majority that the time had come to consider the Federal Arbitration Act as
substantive federal law applicable in state court, the Bernhardt/Erie question at least
needed to be addressed. Instead, the Southland majority dodged the issue – another
indication of the Court’s rush to embrace arbitration notwithstanding the normal rules of
adjudication in the face of contrary precedent.
Both the O’Connor dissent and the Stevens concurrence/dissent in Southland also
make a strong case that the majority’s application of the Act is inconsistent with the
federalism and states’ rights concerns that not only constantly animate American law but
also appear to have been on the mind of the enacting Congress. Justice Stevens, in
addition to noting Justice O’Connor’s compelling review of the legislative history of the
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Act, focuses on the importance of states’ rights and federalism as a strong background
norm of statutory interpretation.143
The Stevens dissent, like much of his judicial work, makes its insights concisely
but powerfully and stakes out a moderate position consistent with his overall approach to
law.144 He respects the text of the statute but does not read it woodenly or hyper-literally.
Instead, he reads the text with a healthy reverence for the legislative history of the law
that may shed light on specific legislative intent. He is mindful of the purpose of the
statute and practical realities of modern commerce and regulation. He respects state
prerogatives in an area of traditional state autonomy and the federalist model of
American government and law. He is willing to read the Act as laying down substantive
law applicable in state as well as federal court but gives breathing space to state contract
law and regulation. He appreciates that the California franchise law is not an antiarbitration law but a franchisee protection law, which arguably takes it out of the broad
reach of 9 U.S.C. 2’s authority to compel arbitration and puts it into the savings clause of
this portion of the Act.
Justices Stevens also correctly recognizes, in light of Justice O’Connor’s strong
arguments based on legislative history, that the Southland majority is engaging in what
might be termed “dynamic” or “evolutive” statutory construction by adapting the 1925
legislation to 1984 commercial reality. “Although Justice O’Connor’s review of the
legislative history . . . demonstrates that the 1925 Congress that enacted the statute
viewed the statute as essentially procedural in nature, I am persuaded that the intervening
developments in the law compel the conclusion that the Court has reached” as to the Act
being substantive law, even if not as to the applicability of the California Franchise
Investment Act.145
Joining the Southland majority opinion were Justices William Brennan, Byron
White, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell.146 With the exception of Justice Brennan,
who espoused support for a “living Constitution” that was interpreted consistent with
changes in American society and who tended to favor federal authority over state
authority in many cases,147 these Justices were traditionalists who eschewed dynamism
for original legislative intent and federalism over unitary control by a central

143

See Stempel, Tainted Love, supra note 11, at 835-37 (reproducing significant portion of Stevens
dissent and discussing at length).
144
See BILL BARNHARDT & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 200-03
(2010); Symposium, The Finest Legal Mind: A Symposium in Celebration of Justice John Paul Stevens, 99
GEO. L.J. 1263 (2011). My personal favorite work of Justice Stevens is his lone dissent in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 880-81 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (in fewer than two pages he demolishes
the majority’s concern that wage and hour regulation of local government employees was too much of a
national intrusion on state sovereignty to withstand Tenth Amendment scrutiny. Within a decade, the full
Court came to appreciate his wisdom and overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985)).
145
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
146
See generally id.
147
Id. (Justice Brennan was arguably being inconsistent with his general sympathy for less powerful
litigants such as workers, women, racial/ethnic minorities, and small businesspersons); see generally SETH
STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION (2010).

25

government.148 But here they are embracing in Southland a result seemingly at odds with
their professed jurisprudential philosophies.
In Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,149 decided the year after Southland, the Court
continued in a pro-arbitration vein. The issue was whether a customer’s mixture of
federal securities claims (not arbitrable because of Wilko v. Swan)150 and state law claims
(clearly arbitrable under the Act if sued on alone) prevented arbitration of the state claims
because they were intertwined with the non-arbitrable federal claim. Resolving a split in
the circuits, the Court rejected the intertwinement doctrine that had required all claims to
go to litigation in some circuits, holding that arbitration of the state law claims could be
compelled and need not await resolution of the securities claims. The Dean Witter
Reynolds v. Byrd decision was unanimous, a reflection of its reasonableness under the
circumstances (by a Court for the moment saddled with the Wilko precedent that was
steadily falling out of fashion).
Concurring separately, Justice White (a member of the Moses H. Cone and
Southland majorities and a consistent supporter of arbitration during his time on the
Court) criticized Wilko and noted that its holding involved only claims under the
Securities Act of 1933 and that too many courts and commentators had assumed the same
reasoning applied to claims brought pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Justice White argued that there were sufficient differences between the laws such that
Wilko’s restriction on arbitration should be confined strictly to 1933 Act claims.151
Although Justice White’s attempt to differentiate the statutes is not particularly
persuasive, it is an important small step on the way to overruling Wilko (and its shaking
1933 Act reasoning based on the then-Court majority’s personal public policy
preferences) and removing this and other statutory restrictions on arbitration.
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,152 the Court again
supported arbitration, dealing an implicit blow to cases like Wilko, Alexander v. GardnerDenver, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best, and McDonald v. West Branch that had restricted
arbitration for statutory claims.153 The Court found no legal barrier to requiring
arbitration of antitrust claims raised by an automobile retailer in its dispute with the
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manufacturer. The contract between the retailer and the manufacturer, as might be
expected in this commercial setting, contained a broadly worded arbitration clause.
Writing for the majority, Justice Harry Blackmun found no basis in statutory text,
legislative intent or purpose, or public policy concerns for cutting back the scope of the
arbitration agreement merely because one of the bases of dispute involved a federal
statute. In reaching this result, the Court sounded more loudly the death knell of Wilko
and similar cases that opposed arbitration of certain claims based on public policy
grounds. “We find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract
within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims,” wrote Justice
Blackmun.154 The majority opinion reiterated much of the pro-arbitration rhetoric of
Moses H. Cone, Southland, and Prima Paint about the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration.155
Two terms later, the Court advanced the cause of arbitrability and sounded the
death knell of Wilko v. Swan in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.156 Picking up
on Justice White’s concurrence in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,157 the Court refused to
extend the securities law statutory exception of Wilko v. Swan to claims made pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although the 1933 Act exception of Wilko was not
dead yet, it was living on borrowed time in that the rationale for refusing a statutory
claim exception in McMahon is equally applicable and powerful as regards 1933 Act
claims that were at issue in Wilko.158 The McMahon Court also rejected the argument that
claims made pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
were exempt from arbitration, a view shared by the entire Court, that also runs counter
the notion of the existence of a statutory claims or public policy exception to
arbitrability.159
McMahon is thus an important pro-arbitration opinion in the sense that it limits
and sets the stage for further curtailment of the statutory claims exception to abitrability.
Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented, arguing that the
1934 Act was sufficiently similar to the 1933 Act that the McMahon claim should enjoy
the protection against arbitrability provided by Wilko v. Swan.160 Although on the losing
side of this significant battle, the dissenters fought hard against the constriction and
foreshadowed demise of Wilko.
The same year, in Perry v. Thomas,161 the Court struck another blow for
arbitration. In a Justice Thurgood Marshall opinion, it compelled arbitration of a wage
claim in the face of a state law exempting wage claims from arbitration. In effect, Merrill
Lynch v. Ware,162 was overruled while Southland v. Keating,163 was affirmed, shoring up
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the strength of the modern, pro-arbitration working majority of the Court four years after
the watershed Southland decision. Perry v. Thomas continued the Court’s embrace of
arbitration on the rhetorical level as well and makes substantial citation of the Court’s
more recent cases with pro-arbitration outcomes.164 The message to even the casual
reader is pretty clear. Arbitration is generally strongly supported by the Court, even in
the face of contrary state law.
Perry v. Thomas is generally susceptible to the same bases of praise or scorn one
might heap on Southland. The majority (Justices Marshall, Burger, Blackmun, Brennan,
and White) is a group purporting to embrace mainstream jurisprudence but arguably
neglecting to consider core mainstream judicial concerns of federalism, state prerogatives
of contract regulation, legislative intent and purpose, and reading the Federal Arbitration
Act’s text too broadly. But Perry may perhaps be better defended than Southland in that
the California Labor Code § 229 appears more directly aimed at arbitration (and thus in
conflict with the now-deemed-substantive federal law) while the California Franchise
Investment Act was a broader prohibition against waivers of all types, not solely
arbitration clauses.165 Only Justices Stevens and O’Connor dissented, each in separate
opinions. Justice O’Connor reiterated her view that the enacting Congress did not intend
for the Federal Arbitration Act to create substantive federal law applicable to state
proceedings and echoed the Stevens view from Southland that the Act’s own language
permits refusal to order arbitration if there were other bases under state law preventing
enforcement of the contract.166
Justice Stevens made a similar argument of legislative intent and purpose and
defended an originalist notion of statutory interpretation even though his Southland
dissent had been relatively dynamic or evolutive in its approach to the statute. 167
Whatever the merits of the pro- and anti-arbitration perspectives clashing in Perry v.
Thomas, it seemed odd that the Court majority did so little to defend its position against
the contention that the majority had been unfaithful to the legislative intent and purpose
of the law, as well as, the rights of the sovereign states to regulate contractual
undertakings. In essence, the Perry majority is resting on the analysis of Southland,
which makes Perry a similarly dynamic approach to construing the Act.
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,168 the Court
completed the process begun in Byrd and McMahon and formally overruled Wilko v.
Swan. The Court had now eliminated the rationale for a statutory claims exception to
arbitration as well as making 1933 Act claims subject to arbitration. Although the abitral
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exceptions for Title VII, FLSA, and Section 1983 claims in prior case law were not
overturned, they appeared in jeopardy.
But in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,169 the Court reaffirmed its apparently
continuing commitment to these public policy exceptions to arbitrability by
distinguishing the earlier statutory cases from Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) claims, for which the Court found no such exception.170 Notwithstanding its
arguable support for exceptions from arbitration for Title VII, FLSA and Section 1983
claims, the Court’s support for arbitration is dramatically on display in Gilmer. The case
involved a securities industry employee making an ADEA claim against the brokerage
house that fired him at age 62. The Gilmer majority, in an opinion by Justice White,
treats the case as simply one of whether a statutory exception exists for ADEA claims
and determines the answer is “no,” as per Rodriguez, McMahon, and Soler ChryslerPlymouth.
The Court gave only the figurative back of its hand (in part because the issue was
raised late in the proceedings by Gilmer’s amici but not by Gilmer himself below)171 to a
much stronger argument contending that the Act itself in its clear text states that
arbitration clauses in employment contracts are not enforceable, at least for workers
engaged in interstate commerce. Section 1 of the Act states that “nothing herein
contained [in the Act] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”172
Rather than simply refusing to consider the § 1 argument because of waiver, the
Gilmer majority used a bit of linguistic sleight of hand to avoid the issue by viewing the
securities industry form signed by Gilmer as something other than a “contract of
employment.”173 The Gilmer majority begs the question of how an arbitration clause can
169
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be sufficiently subject to the Act to be enforceable by the employer if it is not contained
in a contract between them. The success of the securities industry in requiring that all its
licensed brokers sign arbitration agreements would logically make out a stronger case for
extending § 1 protections to those workers, who clearly must agree as a condition of
employment and where it appears that there is no reasonable alternative for the
prospective employee other than submitting to the arbitration clause. Instead, the Gilmer
Court defined the problem away through a legal fiction of sorts.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens, who raised troubling objections to the Court’s
embrace of arbitration rather than federalism or legislative history in Southland, offers a
rather devastating rebuttal. He points out that the Court on many occasions has not
strictly enforced the concept of waiver in order to render a full assessment of a case
before it.174 He then notes that narrowness of the Court’s concept of what constitutes a
“contract of employment.”175 On the issue of the meaning of § 1, Justice Stevens
marshals equally compelling evidence of legislative intent and purpose to protect workers
from unwanted arbitration agreements that could not realistically be avoided because of
the vulnerability of workers seeking work.176 Although the discussion during the
legislative history focused on workers who were constantly and visibly involved in
physical movement across state lines, this was a mere consequence of the involvement
during the legislative process of the leadership of the Seaman’s Union, which
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understandably used seaman as their paradigmatic example of workers who should not be
unfairly saddled with nonconsensual arbitration agreements.177
Although the discussion of the employment exception in Gilmer is necessarily
truncated, it foreshadows the Court’s ultimate unfortunately crabbed reading of §1 in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.178 In taking a narrow view of § 1, the Court
downplayed the text of the Federal Arbitration Act, congressional intent, statutory
purpose, and the federalism concerns of the states in protecting workers from potentially
unfair tribunals that might be imposed upon the workers without their consent due to the
great leverage held by employers.
There is of course a jurisprudential inconsistency of the Court’s broad and
aggressive (and dynamic and evolutive as well) reading of §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the Act
regarding the enforceability of arbitration coupled with the Court’s very narrow reading
of § 1 of the Act protecting employees from compelled arbitration. Logically, § 1 should
receive the same interpretative treatment as does § 2. Given the legislative intent and
statutory purpose of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements between merchants and
halting judicial reluctance to specifically enforce clearly consensual arbitration clauses,
there is nothing inconsistent with a pro-arbitration view of the Act that also recognizes
that the Act does not extend its support of arbitration into the employment context.
Despite the tangential treatment of § 1 in Gilmer, the decision (with only Justices
Stevens and Marshall in dissent) suggests a Court becoming more committed to
arbitration as a process and willing to depart from standard statutory construction to
support this favored process. Ironically, however, the same Court that was moving
toward a narrow view of § 1 and the degree of interstate activity required to protect
workers from unwanted pre-dispute arbitration clauses took a broad view of interstate
commerce regarding the reach of the Act generally.
In a divided opinion in Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,179 the
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act reaches as broadly as the limits of
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. This was hardly a shock in that the
Act had been considered substantive law for ten years since Southland. Further, the
Court has given a broad construction to the concept of interstate commerce at least since
the New Deal – but was unwilling to take a similar approach to interstate commerce
when the issue was whether employees could be bound by an arbitration clause
notwithstanding the exception to arbitration for employment matters set forth in § 1 of the
Act. Dobson continues the Court’s support for arbitration in a cases that are defensible
on their facts but looks bad when juxtaposed with the Court’s unwillingness to give proworker § 1 the same treatment accorded the Act generally. The consistency of all these
decisions, however, is primarily their willingness to use dynamic statutory construction
when it supports expansion of arbitration.
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,180 the Court was again
dynamically pro-arbitration in refusing to apply the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
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(COGSA) to prevent arbitration of a dispute in Japan pursuant to a clause in a bill of
lading for a shipment of oranges from Morocco to Boston, which also included a
Japanese choice of law provision. COGSA provides that:
[a]ny clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the
carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection
with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability otherwise
than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void and of no effect.181
Given a plain reading, COGSA would appear to foreclose imposition of an
arbitration agreement if arbitration resulted in any shrinkage of claimant remedies. But
the Court majority avoided this seeming command of the statute by holding that the
arbitration and choice of law clauses were not provisions “lessening liability.” As Justice
Stevens explained in dissent:
The foreign-arbitration clause imposes potentially prohibitive costs on the
shipper, who must travel – and bring his lawyers, witnesses, and exhibits –
to a distant country in order to seek redress.
*

*

*

The Court assumes that the words “lessening such liability” must be
narrowly construed to refer only to the substantive rules that define the
carrier’s legal obligations. Under this view, contractual provisions that
lessen the amount of the consignee’s net recovery, or that lessen the
likelihood that it will make any recovery at all, are [erroneously placed]
beyond the scope of the statutes. . . . In my opinion, this view is flatly
inconsistent with the purpose of COGSA . . . .182
In effect, the Court majority through its minimization of the practical impact of
the arbitration clause dictating a distant and inconvenient forum and distant applicable
law, held that COGSA, enacted in 1936, a decade after the Federal Arbitration Act, was
trumped by the Act notwithstanding that COGSA would appear to be substantive law
every bit as much as is the Act. Further, the facts of the case presented a rather
sympathetic case of a shipper forced to adhere to a seemingly one-sided contract that
might well fail unconscionability analysis under state law. As the Stevens dissent noted,
COGSA was enacted to correct just such problems.183
Reviewing once again § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, which makes arbitration
clauses specifically enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract, Justice Stevens observed that:
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This language plainly intends to place arbitration clauses upon the same
footing as all other contractual clauses. Thus, like any clause, an
arbitration clause is enforceable “save upon such grounds” as would
suffice to invalidate any other, nonarbitration clause. The FAA thereby
fulfills its policy of jettisoning the prior regime of hostility to arbitration.
Like any other contractual clause, then, an arbitration clause may be
invalid without violating the FAA if, for example, it is procured through
fraud or forgery; there is mutual mistake or impossibility; the provision is
unconscionable; or, as in this case, the terms of the clause are illegal under
a separate federal statue which does not evidence a hostility to arbitration.
Neither the terms nor the policies of the FAA would be thwarted if the
Court were to hold today that a foreign arbitration clause in a bill of lading
“lessens liability” under COGSA. COGSA does not single out arbitration
clauses for disfavored treatment; it invalidates any clause that lessens the
carrier’s liability. Illegality under COGSA is therefore an independent
ground “for the revocation of any contract,” under FAA § 2. There is no
conflict between the two federal statues.
The correctness of this construction becomes even more apparent when
one considers the policies of the two statutes. COGSA seeks to ameliorate
the inequality in bargaining power that comes from a particular form of
adhesion contract. The FAA seeks to ensure enforcement of freely
negotiated agreements to arbitrate. . . . [F]oreign arbitration clauses in bills
of lading are not freely negotiated. COGSA’s policy is thus directly
served by making these clauses illegal; and the FAA’s policy is not
disserved thereby. In contrast, allowing such adhesionary clauses to stand
serves the goals of neither statute.184
Justice Stevens attributed the majority’s error to “overzealous formalism”185 but
the decision appears just as much to be preference for arbitration regardless of the text,
intent, or purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, a preference embraced in spite of the
Act’s direction that arbitration agreements be subject to the very same contract-based
defenses to enforcement listed by Justice Stevens. Just as disturbingly, Justice Stevens
dissented alone. A super-majority of the Court was sufficiently supportive of arbitration
that it pursued it even in the face of contrary substantive law.
Similar substantive preferences for arbitration over states’ rights, federalism and
the right to regulate was reflected a year later in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.186
A Subway sandwich shop franchisee sought to avoid arbitration of his dispute with the
franchiser based on the failure of the arbitration clause in the agreement to comply with
the requirements of a Montana statute, which provided that “[n]otice that a contract is
subject to arbitration. . . shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
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contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to
arbitration.” 187
Reversing the Montana Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
provision was, because of its focus on arbitration, in violation of the Federal Arbitration
Act because the state law did not apply to the revocation of “any” contract but only to
arbitration agreements. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion enjoyed a
supermajority, with only Justice Thomas in dissent, reiterating his view that Southland
was wrongly decided.188
Notwithstanding the strength of the Court’s vote and its consistency with federal
appeals court decisions taking a similarly dim view of similar state laws, Casarotto reads
like an opinion written by a Court wishing to promote arbitration despite countervailing
state goals that are completely consistent with the views of the Congress that enacted the
FAA. The Montana statute was not a ban on specific enforcement of arbitration clauses
but simply a means of forcing disclosure to attempt to ensure that arbitration agreements
are consensual.
The Montana law was, of course, vulnerable to pre-emption because it singles out
arbitration. But this presumably reflected state concern that arbitration agreements
presented particularly pressing problems of disclosure, consent and fairness. A court less
enthused about arbitration could have respected this state policymaking in the traditional
state domain of contract law and been consistent with the Act. Although the state statute
places some additional burden on the drafters of arbitration agreements, the burden is
light and but a disclosure provision rather than a substantive bar to arbitration. Further, a
court less driven to require arbitration could have considered other contract based
defenses to arbitrability and whether Montana’s information-forcing statute was simply a
form of that sort of state-centered policing of contracts.189
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,190 the Court expressly addressed the issue it
had dodged in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane.191 The Circuit City Court ruled that
§ 1 of the Act, which prohibited enforcement of arbitration clauses in employment
contracts, did not apply to all workers engaged in activity affecting commerce but only
applied to those directly involved in interstate movement of goods.192 In reaching this
result, the Court took a narrow construction of § 1 and limited the protections of this part
of the Act to only transportation workers.
As he had in Gilmer, Justice Stevens dissented, this time enjoying support from
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Souter.193 As in Gilmer, Justice Stevens reviewed the
legislative history of the Act and convincingly showed congressional desire to protect
workers subject to adhesionary contracts containing arbitration clauses.194 Although the
language of § 1 could have been broader, it only singles out seamen and railroad workers.
The catchall of “any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce”
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was broad enough to encompass workers involved in non-transportation activities
implicating interstate commerce. Early cases construing § 1 took this view and it was not
until Tenney Eng., Inc. v. Electrical Workers,195 that a contrary view arose in the circuits,
which were still split at the time of the Circuit City decision.196
In addition to criticizing the majority’s pre-arbitration reading of § 1, Justice
Stevens made a persuasive case that the majority ignored both congressional intent and
legislative purpose underlying the statute.
It is not necessarily wrong for the Court to put its own imprint on a statue.
But when its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to
disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by Members
of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the Court misuses its
authority. As the history of the legislation indicates, the potential disparity
in bargaining power between individual employees and large employers
was the source of organized labor’s opposition to the Act, which it feared
would require courts to enforce unfair employment contrasts. . . . When
the Court simply ignores the interest of the unrepresented employee, it
skews its interpretation with its own policy preferences.
*

*

*

A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and
hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court’s
own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the very
purpose for which a provision was enacted. That is the sad result in this
case.197
Justice Souter’s dissent, also joined by the other three dissenters, noted the
difficult-to-defend inconsistency of the Court’s broad construction of § 2, which makes
arbitration agreements specifically enforceable save for contract-based revocation
defenses, and the Court’s narrow construction of § 1 so as to limit employee protection to
only transportation workers.198 Although not speaking in the language of traditionalversus-dynamic statutory construction, the dissent in essence spotlighted the
inconsistency prompting this article’s call for symmetry in construction of the Act
through the expansion of judicial review of arbitration awards.
The Court continued its obvious policy preference for arbitration in Buckeye
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.199 In Buckeye, the Court addressed a variant of the
Prima Paint issue of allocation of initial interpretative authority between the court and
arbitrator.200 The Court held that an issue of whether an allegedly usurious contract
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containing an arbitration clause was illegal and thus void and unenforceable was for the
arbitrator,201 a result that can be justified under Prima Paint even if incorrect or unwise.
Buckeye is thus an example of continued dynamic statutory construction in the service of
keeping more dispute resolution activity before the arbitrator rather than the courts.
Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,202 took the pro-arbitration sentiment of
the Court further in that it prevented parties to an arbitration agreement from
consensually expanding judicial review of arbitration. Hall Street held that parties to an
arbitration agreement could not stipulate to more searching judicial review of any
resulting award, in particular de novo review of the arbitrator’s legal determinations
rather than the more limited menu of grounds for vacating an award set forth in 9 U.S.C.
§ 10. The Court viewed this as an improper attempt to change the applicable law or to
attempt to control the courts.203
Justices Stevens, Kennedy and Breyer dissented.204 All essentially argued that the
Federal Arbitration Act did not preclude such agreements to enlarge the scope of review.
The Stevens dissent noted that there was precedent permitting such agreements prior to
the Act and that neither the text nor the legislative history of the Act suggested that
Congress intended to overturn these precedents.205 Hall Street strengthens arbitration by
preventing judicial review in excess of that provided by § 10 of the Act. But in
“protecting” the courts from litigant efforts to control their discharge of statutory duty,
Hall Street is something of a throwback to pre-Act judicial rulings that refused to enforce
arbitration agreements on the theory that they improperly “ousted” courts from their
established jurisdiction. Inconsistently, Hall Street devalues the “freedom of contract”
concept that animated passage of the Act as well as the sentiment of the commercial
community that fueled passage of the Act. Businesses wanted to have courts enforce
arbitration agreements but Hall Street thwarts that goal. By Hall Street’s reasoning, the
Federal Arbitration Act itself could be characterized as an imposition on the courts that
the judiciary can reject in order to avoid being unduly burdened.
The arbitration jurisprudence of the Roberts Court became increasingly
problematic in 2010 and 2011. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corp.,206 a customer sought class action proceedings in its arbitration with the shipper
when accusing the shipper of illegal price fixing. The arbitration clause of the shipping
contract (a/k/a charter party) used broad language and no one contested that the matter
was subject to arbitration.207 But the shipper was strongly opposed to class action
treatment of the claim. The appointed arbitrators considered the issue and after the
hearing determined to proceed with class treatment of the case but stayed proceedings
pending judicial review.208
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The federal district court vacated this “award” (which, as Justice Ginsburg
pointed out in dissent, was not really what one thinks of as an arbitration award because it
was not a final ruling on the merits and did not order any relief on the merits of the
underlying claim) on the ground that the arbitrators had shown “manifest disregard” of
law because they had failed to conduct a choice of law analysis.209 The Second Circuit
reversed and reinstated the arbitration panel decision.210 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court vacated the decision to proceed on a class basis, holding that class treatment was
improper absent sufficient proof that the shipper (Stolt-Nielsen) had affirmatively
consented to class action arbitration even though it was uncontested that it had consented
to arbitration in general.211
Stolt-Nielsen, a reasonably close 6-3 decision, could be viewed as a curtailment of
the Court’s general affinity for arbitration. The decision, after all, has the immediate
practical effect of limiting an arbitration panel’s power over a dispute. But Stolt-Nielsen
reflects not so much a cooling of arbitral ardor so much as it reveals dramatic
inconsistency in the Court’s support for arbitration. In most of the cases of the modern
(post-Southland) era, the Court has given no serious consideration to issues of consent in
the formation of an arbitration agreement. But in Stolt-Nielsen, where the party resisting
broader arbitration was the party with greater commercial power and where the relief
requested would empower claimants, the Court is suddenly gripped with concern over
whether there exists sufficient consent to arbitrate.212 The law of arbitrability as set forth
in the Court’s pre-Stolt-Nielsen cases of the modern, pro-arbitration era, has been broad
construction of broadly worded arbitration agreements and the presumption that unless
stated to the contrary, arbitration generally should be able to accord the same remedies
that are available in litigation.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer)213 makes the
unassailable argument that the matter was not a final award subject to review under the
Act (9 U.S.C. § 10)214 and takes the sensible view that an agreement to arbitration
ordinarily carries with it an agreement to arbitrate according to whatever rules govern the
proceeding as applied by the arbitrators.
The panel did just what it was commissioned to do. It construed the broad
arbitration clause (covering “[a]ny dispute arising from the making,
performance or termination of this Charter Party,” . . . and ruled, expressly
and only, that the clause permitted class arbitration. The Court acts
209
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without warrant in allowing Stolt-Nielsen essentially to repudiate its
submission of the contract-construction issue to the arbitration panel, and
to gain, in place of the arbitrators’ judgment, this Court’s de novo
determination.
The controlling FAA prescription, § 10(a) authorizes a court to vacate an
arbitration panel’s decision only in very unusual circumstances.”215
In Stolt-Nielsen, “[t]he question properly before the Court is not whether the
arbitrators’ ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’
[under 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4)]. The arbitrators decided a threshold issue, explicitly
committed to them, about the procedural mode available for presentation of
AnimalFeeds’ antitrust claims.”216
As the dissent also noted, the right question to ask in cases like Stolt-Nielsen is
“the proper default rule when there is no stipulation.”217 Where industry-wide arbitration
is the norm, one would logically expect the dispute resolution norm to be one of
according full remedies commensurate with the dispute. And, as the dissent also noted
“[w]hen adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more than modest in size,
class proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants will have
little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.”218
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,219 found the Court back in an unbridled proarbitration mode, holding that an arbitration clause challenged as unconscionable by a
former employee bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination suit must first be assessed
by the arbitrator rather than the court. The clause was broadly drafted, stating that the
arbitrator “and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive
authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability
or formation” of the agreement that was “not limited to any claim that all or any part of”
the agreement was void or voidable.220 But by reading the clause broadly and literally
to preclude judicial assessment of the fairness of the provision, the Court ignored the very
language of § 2 of the Act, which permits contract-based claims for revocation of an
arbitration agreement.
Coming less than two months after the Court’s protection in Stolt-Nielsen of a
large shipping company that had not (in the majority’s view) adequately “consented” to
class treatment of allegations that it had engaged in price fixing, it was inconsistent for
the Court to exhibit little or no concern over the employee’s “consent” to a clause that
truly does seek to oust courts from even the jurisdiction left to them by the drafters of the
215
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Federal Arbitration Act. Similarly odd is the Rent-A-Center Court’s willingness to
permit this when it only two years earlier was unwilling to permit the expanded judicial
review of arbitration awards sought by the contracting parties in Hall Street.221 The
decisions seem irreconcilable except by reference to a raw preference for arbitration with
limited judicial involvement – but (per Stolt-Nielsen) piecemeal arbitration of claims
rather than class treatment.
The majority’s reasoning is circular in that it prevents (until after an award and a
§ 10 challenge to the award) judicial scrutiny of the arbitration clause even though the
worker’s very argument is that the clause was obtained through improper means
(procedural unconscionability) or was unreasonably favorable to the employer
(substantive unconscionability). In particular, the arbitration clause contained a feesharing provision that the trial court had determined was not substantively
unconscionable and which had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, with other
unconscionability arguments pending review had the Supreme Court not intervened.222
The Rent-A-Center majority justified its holding as a natural extension of Prima
Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,223 and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna,224
which held that attacks on the contract containing an arbitration clause are for the
arbitrator because such attacks do not question the validity of the arbitration clause itself.
But allowing arbitrators to assess contract revocation defenses that do not focus on
arbitration is one thing. Allowing boilerplate arbitration agreements imposed on
employees (who would be free of such clauses had the Court decided Gilmer or Circuit
City correctly) is quite another.
Rent-A-Center, was consistent with the Court’s dynamic, pro-arbitration approach
to the Act. Under Rent-A-Center, it is not enough to require judicial enforcement of
arbitration clauses after judicial investigation determines they apply to the dispute and are
not subject to a revocation defense under § 2. Now, parties favoring arbitration, even the
highly problematic mass arbitration that was foreign to the drafters of the Act, can
remove courts from inquiry altogether, restricting the judicial role to its limited authority
to police arbitration awards after the fact pursuant to the limited scope of § 10 of the Act
(that is, unless, the Court takes an unjustifiably expansive view of § 10, as it did in StoltNielsen).
Then came AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,225 which involved the purchase
by Vincent and Lisa Concepcion of mobile phones subject to an AT&T Mobility
(“AT&T”) service contract. And like most cellphone service contracts, the AT&T
contract provided for arbitration, including the right of AT&T to “make unilateral
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amendments, which it did to the arbitration provisions on several occasions.”226 The
Concepcions brought litigation alleging the improper charging of $30.22 in sales tax on
the supposedly “free” phones they received from AT&T as part of the service agreement,
a complaint that was consolidated with a putative class action alleging fraud and false
advertising in that the company had advertised the phones as “free” as part of the service
arrangement.227
AT&T in turn moved to compel arbitration of the Concepcion claim. The
Concepcions resisted, asserting that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and
“unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide
procedures.”228 Because the arbitration clause forbade class action treatment of claims,
the trial court and the Ninth Circuit found it unconscionable under California law on the
strength of Discover Bank v. Superior Court,229 which held that limitations on remedies
such as a ban on class actions were unconscionable contract provisions.
Notwithstanding that Discover Bank and earlier class action precedent such as
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services230 can reasonably be characterized
as unconscionability decisions in which the unreasonably fair terms simply happened to
be contained in an arbitration clause,231 the Concepcion majority characterized California
law as specifically anti-arbitration law that was precluded by the Act. “The question in
this case is whether § 2 pre-empts California’s rule classifying most collective arbitration
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. We refer to this rule as the Discover
Bank rule. . . . California courts have frequently applied this rule [that waivers in
consumer contracts that limit consumer remedies are unconscionable] to find arbitration
agreements unconscionable.”232
The Concepcion majority construed Discover Bank to be a restriction on
arbitration rather than an unconscionability rule of which a particular contract provision
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(the AT&T arbitration agreement) ran afoul. In doing so, it embraced the view of critics
who had opposed this application of California unconscionability law.233
The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4,
is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.
Requiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes
of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.234
Beyond this formalist but erroneous analysis (in error because it so misread the
statutory language and congressional intent and purpose as well as ignoring federalism
concerns),235 the Concepcion majority was also engaged in dynamic construction that
expanded the arbitration imposition and arbitration enforcement portions of the Act, 236 at
least so long as the arbitration is bilateral, limited in scope, and not vested with too many
of the leveling characteristics of litigation such as class treatment, liberal joinder of
parties, and broad access to discovery.237
In particular, the majority saw California unconscionability law as a barrier that
must be dismantled out of a view that arbitration works best when bilateral and that
“[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” and “increases risks
233

See id. at 1746-47 (citing Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, supra note 231, at 186-87).
234
131 S. Ct. at 1748.
235
See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing the language, structure, and legislative
background of the Arbitration Act)..
236
See, e.g., 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration
processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute. It can be
specified, for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be
kept confidential to protect trade secrets. And the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable,
reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”).
237
See 131 U.S. at 1750-52 (emphasis in original):
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different
procedures and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. And
while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the
class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the oftendominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. . . . .
[A] switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage of
arbitration – its informality – and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment. . . . .
Second, class arbitration requires procedural formality. . . . We find it unlikely that in
passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of these procedural
requirements to an arbitrator [but this observation comes from the same Court that in
Rent-A-Center was willing to allow the arbitrator to have total control of determining
whether the arbitration clause at issue encompassed the instant dispute]. . . .
Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . .
Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation.
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to defendants.”238 Once again, the Court is embracing arbitration when it serves the
interest of the business establishment and requiring adherence to arbitration clauses
generally so that arbitration replaces much litigation. But at the same time, the Court is
also embracing a view that leverage to plaintiffs provided by class treatment is so
threatening to business defendants as to unfairly coerce settlement.239 Although this has
long been a rallying cry of forces opposing class actions, the most sophisticated
scholarship on the topic has largely debunked this view as a canard.240
In Concepcion, the dissenters reflect a stronger commitment to the standard rules
of adjudication and a more realistic picture of the practical implications of the decision to
which they object. In the main, however, the dissenters are simply truer than the majority
to both federalism concerns and legislative intent and purpose.241
But the dissenters, like the majority, also could not resist a public policy
argument. But at least the public policy of the dissenters recognizes the realities of small
claims practice and the potential for class treatment to level the playing field upon which
larger, wealthier, repeat player institutional litigants contend with largely unorganized
individuals of modest means. More important in terms of the mainstream rules of
jurisprudence, the dissent reflects the type of respect for traditional state contract law
prerogatives reflected in the text of the Act and its legislative history.242 Emphasizing
238
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their legislative intent and purpose advantages over the majority, the dissenters also noted
that it was quite clear that in passing the Act, Congress was focused on merchants acting
“under the customs of their industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent
bargaining power.”243
Although the dissent hews considerably closer to mainstream approaches to
statutory construction and to the text and legislative intent of the Act than does the
Concepcion majority, the majority was able to put together an argument based on
precedent because the Court’s arbitration decisions of the prior 30 years had steadily
moved away from fidelity to statutory text, legislative intent, the purpose of the Act, and
concern for values of consent and fairness in contracting. Instead of more traditional
statutory construction, the Court’s arbitration decisions have been marked by an
evolution in its view of the Act or even a re-writing of the Act that dynamically expanded
the use of arbitration.
The Concepcion majority was so intent on striking down California’s use of the
authority provided in § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act that it exhibited a truly
embarrassing moment of judicial Alzheimer’s. After criticizing California’s Discover
Bank doctrine of unconscionability as unduly targeted against arbitration, the Concepcion
majority observed that “[o]f course States remain free to take steps addressing the
concerns that attend contracts of adhesion – for example, requiring class-action-waiver
provisions in adhesive arbitration agreements to be highlighted.”244 The problem, of
course, is that the Court prohibited just this type of state disclosure statute in Doctor’s
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto a mere 15 years earlier245
In its modern era, the Court has reflected an unrealistically positive view of the
wonders of arbitration – so upbeat that it is willing in most cases to impose arbitration in
situations far exceeding those envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act246
despite significant issues of states’ rights, the quality of contract consent, the fairness of
the arbitration tribunal, and the overall operation of the dispute resolution system. But at
crucial junctures, the Court strains to rein in arbitration when concerned that arbitration
may reach results the Court dislikes or come to resemble litigation. On one metaphorical
hand, the Court expands the reach of the Act through dynamic statutory construction
(albeit often sub silentio) while on the other hand, it thwarts arbitration developments it
dislikes through application of more traditional statutory approaches (albeit inconsistently
applied) and the majority’s personal preference as to what constitutes acceptably
conducted arbitration.

length while a call is placed on hold). Discover Bank sets forth circumstances in which
the California courts believe that the terms of consumer contracts can be manipulated to
insulate an agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds by “deliberately cheating
large numbers of consumer out of individually small sums of money.” Why is this kind
of decision – weighing the pros and cons of all class proceedings alike – not California’s
to make?
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During the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration
disputes247 has usually reflected zeal for arbitration and a corresponding if subconscious
derogation of litigation, at least if resorted to by consumers or employees. This has
produced an inconsistent, oft-criticized body of Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence.248
In particular, the support for arbitration and willingness to stretch the reach of the Act
seems to apply only when arbitration functions as the Court thinks it should.249 For
example, where arbitration seeks to embrace classwide solutions to disputes, the majority
becomes hostile.250 It also becomes less supportive of arbitration when arbitration
becomes too close to litigation or too seemingly advantageous to less powerful
disputants,251 in particular with regard to class treatment of disputes, something largely
opposed by the business community that seems to enjoy particular favor with the
Court.252 Inconsistently, the Court resists when commercial actors seek to stipulate to
broader judicial review of an arbitration award.253
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,254 Rent-A-Center West,
Inc. v. Jackson,255 and, most recently in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,256 the
Roberts Court far exceeded its predecessors in problematic attitudes toward arbitration.
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court overturned an arbitration panel’s considered decision to permit
class action treatment of a matter based on the record of the dispute and the custom and
practice of dispute resolution in this industry.257 In Rent-A-Center, the Court permitted
the drafter of the arbitration agreement to eject the judiciary from process of determining
whether an arbitration agreement had in fact been made – a decision at odds with the
statutory language and the Court’s recent prior precedent in Hall Street forbidding the
parties to agree to an expanded judicial role in policing arbitration agreements and
247
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outcomes.258 In Concepcion, the Court struck down a decision refusing to uphold an
arbitration clause restricting class actions based on California state contract law that
deemed unconscionable such contractual limitations on consumer remedies.
Concepcion is a particularly glaring display (by a bare 5-4 majority vote) of the
Court’s infatuation with arbitration overcoming what should have been its fidelity to the
language, legislative intent, and purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act as well as
inadequate appreciation of states’ rights and the legal system’s commitment to making
the class action remedy available in apt cases.259 Concepcion, like Stolt-Nielsen, is also a
reflection of the Court’s uneven view toward arbitration – supporting imposition of
arbitration through a dynamic and expansive approach to the statute but invoking more
conservative and formal statutory construction jurisprudence when addressing limits on
arbitration or means by which arbitration may operate more like litigation or serve the
less powerful disputants.260
IV. RETHINKING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
As reflected in a review of the Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration decisions of
the past 30 years, the Act has been transformed from a procedural device applicable in
federal court to enforce commercial arbitration clauses into a national law mandating
mass arbitration of consumer and employment disputes. In effect, arbitration has
transplanted litigation for many types of disputes as it has moved from subsets of
merchants (e.g., international shippers) into the new mass arbitration (e.g., complaints
about mobile phones, disputes over credit card debt).
But in spite of having converted arbitration from a consensual arrangement
between merchants into a de facto default method of dispute resolution for vendors
willing to impose arbitration upon consumers or workers, the Court has inconsistently
acted to prevent the incorporation of procedural devices such as class resolution.261
Perhaps even more troublingly, it has been unwilling to give adequate deference to
statutory restrictions on arbitration262 and unwilling to permit parties to expand the scope
of judicial review of the arbitrations they choose.263
258

See supra text accompanying notes 219-224.
See supra text accompanying notes 225-258.
260
See Stempel, supra note 240 (noting degree to which class treatment of issues tends to increase the
leverage of less powerful litigants and that institutional or “repeat player” litigants such as governments,
businesses, or insurers tend have this power in ordinary, non-class litigation)., accord, Bruce Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378-82 (2000) (noting leveling effect of class treatment). For discussion of the
degree to which “repeat player” litigants have advantages over “one-shot” litigants (e.g., consumers,
employees, debtors), see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (the “seminal article” on this point); see also Stempel,
supra note 240, at 1166; Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still
Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 809 (1999) (finding continued vitality in Professor
Galanter’s typology and observation).
261
See supra text accompanying notes 206-260 (discussing Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds and
Concepcion).
262
See supra text accompanying notes 180-185 (discussing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 530 (1995).
263
See supra text accompanying notes 202-211 (discussing Hall Street v. Mattel).
259
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Under these circumstances, some restoration of symmetry is in order. If
arbitration is to supplant litigation en masse, at least the arbitration that takes place
should be adequately subject to the rule of law. When arbitration results no longer turn
on guild folkways or the special norms of a given industry but instead involve millions of
ordinary consumer transactions, this new expanded net of arbitration logically requires
judicial review commensurate with arbitration’s new role. This in turn requires adequate
judicial policing of arbitration awards to ensure that they comply with applicable law.
Achieving this, in the absence of congressional legislation, requires the Court to construe
this portion of the Act as dynamically as it has the arbitration enforcement sections of the
law.264
As previously noted, the Act, particularly as currently construed by a working
majority of the Court, is tilted toward enforcing arbitration awards.265 Section 10 of the
Act permits arbitration awards to be challenged, but on grounds considerably narrower
than those available in litigation.266 Specifically, an arbitration award may be vacated:
• where the award was “procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;”
• where there was “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;”
• where the arbitrators erred by refusing to delay a hearing for good cause
or to hear “pertinent and material evidence” or where there was “any other
misbehavior” prejudicing the rights of the parties; or
• where the arbitrators exceeded the scope of their power in light of the
matter submitted to them or “so imperfectly” executed their power “that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made.”267
The clearest portions of §10 are fine as far as they go. Of course awards that are
the product of fraud, corruption, duress, or clear favoritism should not stand. But the
case law of §10 and motions to disqualify arguably tainted arbitrators prior to the
rendering of an award suggests that courts take the impartiality of arbitrators somewhat
less seriously than they treat judicial disqualification.268 A full examination of this
264

See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (describing the structure and content of the Act).
See 9 U.S.C. §9 (2006) (specifying that federal courts may confirm awards and enter judgment
based on the award which in turn gives the prevailing arbitration party the normal range of judgment
collection tool under applicable procedural law); see also 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2006) (providing limited grounds
for making technical or numerical corrections to ministerial errors of arbitration awards); see also 9 U.S.C.
§16 (2006) (governing appeals and reflecting congressional preference (largely through 1990 amendments
rather than the original 1925 enactment) to reduce appellate challenge to pro-arbitration orders but permits
appellate review of orders refusing to compel arbitration or refusing to stay judicial proceedings pending
arbitration).
266
See 9 U.S.C. §10 (2006) (providing that reviewing court may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators if
ground for vacating award is shown).
267
See id.
268
See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and
Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 187, 206-10 (2012) (concluding conflicts of
265
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shortcoming is beyond the scope of this article but substantial scholarly commentary
supports treating issues of arbitrator impartiality akin to the manner in which reviewing
courts insist on judicial impartiality.269 Admittedly, the language of § 10 is narrower than
that of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct270 and its state analogs as well as the
federal disqualification statute.271 Further, the Congress of the Federal Arbitration Act
appears to have intended no greater policing of arbitrator impartiality.272 But the
interest, bias, lack of neutrality of arbitrators taken less seriously than disqualification of judges on similar
grounds) [hereinafter Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards]; Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)Partial
Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395 (2010) [hereinafter Embedded
Neutrals].
269
See, e.g., Welsh, Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, supra note 268 ; Welsh, Embedded
Neutrals, supra note 268; Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA
to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial
Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contact, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99
(2007). This is not to say that courts consistently do a good job regarding judicial impartiality. For
example, in one notorious case, a state supreme court judge participated (casting the then-deciding vote) in
a case in which a defendant company’s CEO had provided more then $3 million of electoral support to the
judge in a recent election. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on due process grounds, but only by a 5-4
vote. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to Failings of
Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2010) (describing case and state judge’s clearly erroneous
failure to recuse as well as Court’s ruling). In another judicial cliff-hanger of sorts, the Court in another 5-4
vote disqualified a federal trial judge who sat in the case of a multi-million dollar deal involving a
university of which he was a board member. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847
(1988). The trial judge whose indefensible conduct was so strongly defended by the dissenters was
subsequently convicted of taking bribes and removed from the bench. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 510 (7th ed. 2005).
270
In contrast to § 10’s ban on bias, corruption, or evident partiality, § 2.11 of the ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which has been largely adopted in each state, requires disqualification when the judge’s
“impartiality might be reasonably questioned” as well as when the judge has bias, prejudice, or mere
personal knowledge of the parties or the dispute. In addition, § 2.11 requires disqualification in the event
of family or financial connections linking the judge to the litigants or the case; so does the federal
disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455. Further, the Model Judicial Code (in Canons 3 & 4) also places
limits on judicial behavior broader than those imposed on most arbitrators. This is not to say that there are
no rules governing arbitrators. Organizations such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
Judicial and Mediation Services (JAMS) have codes of ethics and rules of their own regarding
disqualification of neutral arbitrators (recall than in some arbitrations, each side appoints an arbitrator who
is permitted to be a partisan advocate). But even if these strictures were as strong as those applied to state
and federal judges, the fact remains that many mass arbitrations are conducted not by respected
organizations of this type but by other organizations that may be unduly supportive of repeat player
disputants who can continue to provide work to the organization. Or the arbitrators may be part of an
employer or vendor’s own “in-house” system of arbitration or be subject to no organizational strictures.
271
The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires disqualification if there are any of a number of family
or financial interests of the judge implicated in the controversy (§ 455(b)) while § 455(a) requires
disqualification whenever the arbitrator’s impartiality is subject to reasonable question.
272
The Act’s legislative history, both in general and regarding arbitrators disqualification, is sparse.
See STEPHEN K. HUBER & MAUREEN A. WESTON, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-14 (3d ed.
2011); IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
ch. 1 (1994) (probably the most extensive treatment of legislative history of Act found in treatises);
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy, supra note 88, at 260-265. Indeed, the legislative history is so sparse or
considered so distant in time and practical use that many casebooks or treatises devote no attention to the
passage of the Act. See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DISPUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE AND LAW
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dynamic expansion of §§ 2-4 of the Act requires a corresponding expansion of § 10’s
strictures regarding arbitrator neutrality. Sauce for the goose of mass arbitration imposed
through “agreements” reflected in package inserts should also be sauce for the gander of
ensuring that this new form of modern mass arbitration be adequately policed for
adjudicator neutrality in a manner reflecting its status as a substitute for litigation rather
than a means of honoring industry norms.
Other § 10 grounds for vacating an award also make sense. An award that is the
product of unduly hurried or truncated arbitration in which one or both parties lacked fair
opportunity to present the case should also be set aside (§ 10(3)). Likewise, when
arbitrators render awards clearly beyond the scope of what was submitted for decision
(the “exceeded their powers” language of § 10(4)), the award should not stand. But what
about arbitration awards that are legally incorrect? Surely such awards are at least as
troublesome as those emerging from a biased arbitrator (who nonetheless may reach the
correct result) or where the arbitrators refused to provide a disputant with an additional
deposition or production of documents that may or may not have impacted the result.
Consider a charitable pledge with an arbitration clause on which the donor fails to
make the promised contribution. Currently, nearly 80 percent of the states provide that
promises to make charitable gifts are enforceable even if they lack consideration by the
recipient.273 If the arbitration clause provided for application of the law of one of these
states,274 an arbitration award refusing to order payment because of lack of consideration
would be clearly incorrect – and would clearly create a different result in arbitration than
what would have been obtained in either state or federal court subject to that state’s
law.275
Disparate results between arbitration and litigation would seem unjustified. A
deal should be enforceable or unenforceable without regard to the forum in which it is the
(2d ed. 2010); LEONARD RISKIN, ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS (4th ed. 2009) (abridged).
The most logical conclusion is that the enacting Congress meant what it said in the text of § 10 and wanted
to upend arbitration awards only in cases of clear bias or similarly troubling issues rather than based on a
broader notion that arbitrators should be at sufficient arms length from the disputants or the controversy.
Recall that when the Act was passed, its drafters envisioned arbitrations involving merchants in a particular
industry, making it likely that many arbitrators would of course have familiarity with the industry and its
participants.
273
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 225-27 (6th ed. 2009); E. ALLAN
FARNWORTH, CONTRACTS 91-92 (4th ed. 2004); EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 53, at 283; AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981); Steve Thel & Edward Yorio, The
Promissory Basis of Past Consideration, 78 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1080-81 (1992). See, e.g., Jewish Fed’n v.
Baroness, 560 A.2d 1353 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (enforcing on grounds of public policy);
Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (leading case in the area authored by
then Judge Benjamin Cardozo, but one finding promissory estoppel rather than express absence of need for
consideration to make gift pledge binding).
274
For example, Iowa. See, e.g., Salisbury v. Northwestern Bell, 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); see
also PERILLO, supra note 273, at 225-227 (citing cases); FARNSWORTH, supra note 273, at § 2.19 (citing
cases).
275
As all judges presumably know, the rules of law announced in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938) and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) were designed to achieve
uniformity between state and federal adjudication of similar disputes, at least in terms of applicable law, by
requiring use of relevant state law – including application of the choice of law rules of the forum state -- in
federal court matters where jurisdiction was not founded on a federal question. See FLEMING JAMES, JR.,
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 2.13-2.17 (6th ed. 2011).
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subject of dispute. Even if the arbitration clause was silent as to applicable law, a
decision requiring consideration to enforce the promise simply seems wrong in that it
runs counter to the great bulk of American law on the issue.276
But under the prevailing approach of § 10 review, these types of pretty clearly
incorrect arbitration decisions are unlikely to be overturned. Some courts have
interpreted § 10 broadly to create a “manifest disregard of law” ground for vacating an
arbitration award.277 Under this approach, an award may be set aside if “the arbitrators
appreciated the existence and applicability of a controlling legal rule but intentionally
decided not to apply it.”278 Although there is considerable variance in judicial use of the
manifest disregard approach and little definitive Supreme Court discussion,279
particularly in the modern era of mass arbitration, there is no doubt that manifest
disregard review of arbitration awards is substantially narrower than ordinary appellate
review regarding errors of law and that § 10 in operation is far more deferential to
arbitration outcomes than the yardstick courts apply to trial outcomes.280
276

In addition, real world cases will often involve nontrivial evidence of detrimental reliance by the
charitable organization promised a gift (at least if the gift is large) and the doctrine of promissory estoppels
may apply to make the pledge enforceable.
277
The doctrine has roots in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 47 (1989) but has never really been
assessed at length by the modern Court. The doctrine has developed in the lower courts and different
circuits have different approaches to the doctrine. In Wilko, the Court stated that while “the interpretations
of the law” by arbitrators are not subject to judicial review under the Arbitration Act but suggested that
decisions reflecting “manifest disregard” may be subject to review; see 346 U.S. at 436-37. See also
Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justices of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L.
REV. 47, 75-82 (2010) (describing manifest disregard and calling for its expansion); Christopher R.
Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEV. L.J. 234, 234 (2007) (describing and recommending
clarification and codification, but not necessarily expansion).
278
Cytyc Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd. P’ship, 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (cited as a “common
formulation of the test for manifest disregard.”). See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235 (noting that some
circuits make it more difficult to invoke the doctrine by adding “that [the] law [at issue] must be “well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.”) See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235 (citing Bear,
Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2005)).
279
See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235, noting that every federal appellate court has used some form
of manifest disregard of law review and also observing:
As a “non-statutory” or “judicially created” ground for vacating arbitration awards, based on
dicta in an overruled Supreme Court case, [manifest disregard] lacks a firm doctrinal footing.
The circuits disagree on what manifest disregard is (with the Seventh Circuit in particular
adopting its own, idiosyncratic approach) and how the standard should be applied. Id. at 23435 (footnotes omitted).
States are also divided both as to the permissibility of the approach and the application of it. See id. at 235.
See also Sooner Builders & Inv., Inc. v. Nolan Hatcher Constr. Servs., L.L.C., 164 P.3d 1063, 1072 nn.1415 (Okla. 2007)(collecting state cases adopting or rejecting manifest disregard).
280
See Drahozal, supra note 277, at 235-38; see generally Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The
Revolving Door of Justice: Arbitration Agreements that Expand Court Review of an Award, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL, 861 (2004) (finding challenges to arbitration on manifest disregard grounds fairly frequent
but unsuccessful more than 90 percent of the time); Stephen L. Hayford, Reining in the “Manifest
Disregard” of the Law Standard: The Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL.
117, 125-26 (summarizing and categorizing approaches and, although critical of some courts for overly
aggressive review, concluding that review is largely deferential).
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This situation of greater deference to arbitration than is accorded to trial courts
made sense in 1925 – even though federal trial judges are selected only after a substantial
vetting process that includes confirmation by the U.S. Senate while anyone selected by
the parties can be an arbitrator, regardless of training, intelligence, criminal record or the
like.281 But in 1925, arbitration meant commercial arbitration or specialized industry or
guild arbitration in which relatively sophisticated repeat players chose arbitrators based
on the candidate’s knowledge of the business rather than the candidate’s legal
pedigree.282 Because a primary object of the Act was to require courts to give breathing
space for industry expertise,283 it made perfect sense to adopt a deferential standard of
review.
But that was then and this is now. Arbitration today, although still including the
commercial and specialized arbitrations of the early 20th Century, is largely composed of
mass arbitration frequently involving consumers or lower level employees who can
hardly be viewed as insiders, repeat players, or participants in an industry where dispute
resolution turns on specialized industry norms.284 In mass arbitration, the correct results
are presumptively results that accord with the substantive law because this type of
arbitration involves wholesale displacement of a large amount of adjudication with a
system of privatized dispute resolution without the specialized decisional norms that
might prevail for certain industries or trades. Consequently, awards produced through the
281

I do not mean to imply that arbitrators tend to be disproportionately drawn from the dregs of
humanity. Quite the contrary, to become an arbitrator for an established dispute resolution organization
like AAA or JAMS normally requires experience and a good reputation in the relevant legal, commercial,
construction, or employment community. But not all arbitrations are conducted by reputable organizations
– or any organization at all. Or an arbitration may be “in-house” as established by the vendor or employer
imposing arbitration on a consumer, employee, or contractors. Consequently, there will be varying
standards for qualifying as an arbitrator and varying means of quality control. Although not all judges are
Learned Hand or Louis Brandeis, federal judges in particular are subjected to substantial scrutiny and state
court judges, even those in relatively wide-open electoral systems, regularly receive scrutiny by the
organized bar, the press, and political opponents.
282
See MACNEIL, ET AL., supra note 272, at ch. 1 (noting that commercial arbitration within a given
industry or field was what was envisioned by Congress at the time of the Act); see also Stempel, Pitfalls of
Public Policy, supra note 88, at 277-83; Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal
Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926) (describing arbitration as composed largely of agreements by
commercial actors in the same industry). See also Lisa Bernstein, Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, supra note 29 (describing traditional role of arbitration in a specialized guild or
industry).
283
See MACNEIL, ET AL., supra note 272, at ch. 1; George Gluck, Great Expectations: Meeting the
Challenge of a New Arbitration Paradigm, 23 AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 231, 234 (2012) (“The disputes
envisioned as suitable for arbitration [at the time of passage of the Act] were business-to-business disputes
that required quick and efficient resolution – precisely the type that had been privately resolved long before
arbitration agreements were officially blessed by legislators. These were often trade disputes, which the
parties agreed to have resolved by a senior and respected member of the trade, effectively opting out of the
dispute resolution forum offered by the State.”) (footnotes omitted); Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy,
supra note 88, at 277-83; Cohen & Dayton, supra note 282 (noting that the history and intent behind the
Act; largely supported by commercial actors to ensure enforcement of arbitration agreements contained in
contracts between merchants), accord, Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 97-102 (2012); Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an
Error: Replacing “Manifest Disregard” With a New Framework for Reviewing Arbitration Awards, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 113-116 (2012).
284
See Stempel, Mandating Minimum Fairness, supra note 11; Schwartz, supra note 248, at 107-08;
Sternlight, supra note 248.
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newer mass arbitration of today must logically comport with substantive law in order to
merit judicial enforcement.
Continuing to use the 1925 concept of § 10 for reviewing mass arbitrations
resulting from the Court’s dynamic expansion of §§ 2-4 during the past 30 years
effectively permits arbitrations that err (such as the mythical charitable giving contract
enforcement discussed above)285 to be accorded the force of a judgment when courts
would themselves regard such a judgment as error. This is an untenable situation
requiring change – both to bring statutory construction harmony to the different aspects
of the Act and to prevent unduly disparate results between arbitration and adjudication.
The conventional wisdom, of course, is that this cannot be done without
amendment of the Act.286 But courts can in fact legitimately update the application of
§ 10 to arbitration without a congressional change in the law. The Supreme Court’s nowlongstanding dynamic construction of the Act has opened the door to an expanded
reading of § 10 (and § 1 should the Court ever reverse or sufficiently modify Circuit City
and Gilmer).287 The Court long-ago departed from a strictly textualist or originalist
approach to the Act and its intent and purpose, at least regarding §§ 2-4288 and has
arguably done so for § 1, albeit in a way many regard as incorrect.289 The Court has
285

See supra notes 273-276 and accompanying text (describing hypothetical arbitration in which
arbitrator clearly is incorrect regarding the result that would obtain under prevailing law).
286
See Welsh, Procedural Safeguards, supra note 268; Cole, supra note 269. It is a conventional
wisdom to which I have fallen prey in the past. See Stempel, supra note 269, at 264-68. Upon further
reflection over the years, perhaps fueled by the increasingly asymmetric dynamism of the Roberts Court
and additional instances of lawless or erroneous arbitration results, I have come to believe that courts can
legitimately give Section 10 of the Act the broader construction recommended in this article without acting
impermissibly outside the accepted judicial role. See also Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory
Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1309 (2011) (advocating broader judicial policing of mass arbitration via
external regulation rather than reinterpretation of § 10 of the Act); Davis, supra note 283, at 131 (article
urging expanded judicial review of arbitration awards criticizes Court’s failures in construction and
concludes that “[m]aybe it’s time for Congress to act.”). As Professor Weston notes, the Court’s overbroad
expansion of the Act has effectively barred state regulatory action that touches significantly upon
arbitration. See Maureen Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and
Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 59 (2013).
287
See supra notes 169-178, 190-198 and accompanying text (discussing Gilmer and Circuit City and
Court’s narrow construction of § 1 of the Act); see also Stempel, supra note 12.
288
See supra notes 129-260 (reviewing Court’s modern Arbitration Act jurisprudence).
289
See Matthew F. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in
Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996); Stempel, supra note 12; Ronald
Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union
Waiver of the Individual Worker’s Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135 (2000);
Kenneth F. Dunham, Great Gilmer’s Ghost: The Haunting Tale of the Role of Employment Arbitration in
the Disappearance of Statutory Rights in Discrimination Cases, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 303 (2005);
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). Although Circuit City and Gilmer took a crabbed
view of the § 1 employment contract exception, it was not because of applying a conservative approach to
statutory construction. If the Court had done so, it could have concluded the exercise in favor of the
employees in short order, see supra notes 169-178, 190-198 and accompanying text.
The text of § 1 of the Act is pretty clear: the imposition of arbitration based on a written agreement is
not to “apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Under modern notions of interstate
commerce, which the Court has been happy to invoke to support required arbitration, many workers other
than sailors and railroad workers qualify, at least as a matter of text.
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implicitly legitimized dynamic statutory construction as an acceptable approach to
applying legislation, even if it is unlikely to explicitly say so.
Although the outcomes of many of the Court’s arbitration cases have been widely
criticized by scholars and consumer groups, they have been just as fervently supported by
business interests and some elements of the judiciary attracted by arbitration’s reduction
in the judicial docket. And to state the obvious, none of the Justices responsible for this
dynamic expansion of the Federal Arbitration Act have been the target of impeachment
actions or similar political retaliation. The logical conclusion is that the legal body
politic has now silently accepted statutory dynamism as acceptable mainstream
jurisprudence even though at times unhappy with the results. Although the Court’s 1984
Southland decision has been criticized for its dynamism,290 that scholarly critique is
largely in the rear view mirror and the Justices making this argument have dropped this
protest.291
In light of this history, it is now open to courts to view § 10 through a dynamic
lens – and courts should do so. Looking at § 10, particularly § 10(4), through this lens
makes a strong case for providing broader judicial review of arbitration awards stemming
from modern mass arbitrations and vacating them when they make errors of law or fact
that would result in reversal of trial court decisions containing the same errors. However,
where the arbitration award under review emanates from the type of traditional
commercial or industry arbitration prevailing at the time of the Act, courts may continue
to apply § 10 in a deferential manner. Reading § 10 in this dynamic manner in harmony
with the Court’s post-Southland era comports sufficiently with mainstream jurisprudence.
Supporters of keeping arbitration less like litigation and relatively free of judicial
review will undoubtedly not warm to my proposal. 292 But traditional judicial deference
would under my proposal continue to obtain for traditional arbitration. It bears emphasis
Although the enacting Congress may have had a narrower intent in that they had a specific group in
mind, this would not (pun slightly intended) derail most conservative judges from applying the text of the
statute. To the extent non-textual factors are invoked, they auger in favor of a broader reading of §1 so that
workers received protection against imposed arbitration akin to what they enjoyed at the time the Act was
passed.
290
See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55
(2004); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Schwartz, supra note 248; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights,
71 N.C. L. REV. 81 (1993). There are, of course, other important scholarly voices more hospitable to
Southland and the modern era both as a matter of statutory construction and practical impact. See, e.g.,
Christopher R. Dahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002).
291
As compared to the 1990s and early Twenty-First Century, there has been markedly less scholarship
arguing that Southland was wrongly decided or advocating return to the pre-Southland view that the Act
was a procedural statute intended to control in federal court but not to lay down substantive law applicable
in state courts. After Southland, some members of the Court, particularly Justices O’Connor and Thomas,
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that the broader, litigation-like appellate review urged in this article would apply only to
the new, mass arbitration that has supplanted litigation for many consumer and
employment disputes. This of course may prompt the criticism that I am being
inconsistent in a manner similar to the Supreme Court’s differential modes of statutory
construction in arbitration cases. My response: the notion of “imperfect” execution of
arbitrator power differs depending upon whether the arbitration in question was an
industry or commercial norms arbitration or was instead the type of modern mass
arbitration imposed on consumers and employees, which unless otherwise agreed should
be governed by applicable law rather than insider norms or arbitrary decisions.
Using that most mainstream of factors, text, a natural reading of the statute would
permit the conclusion that an arbitrator’s clear legal error would constitute “misbehavior”
prejudicing the rights of the parties or execution of the arbitrator’s power that was
executed “so imperfectly” as to require setting aside the award. A textual approach to §
10(4) can support a more expansive review of awards than courts have traditionally
accorded. This provision of the statute provides that arbitration awards should be vacated
where the arbitration is “so imperfectly executed that a mutual, final, and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”293
The dictionary defines “imperfect” as (of course) “not perfect” and “defective.”294
In matters of modern mass arbitration that do not involve industry norms or particularized
customs for doing business, the implicit understanding is that although arbitration differs
from adjudication in procedural formality, the arbitral claimant or defendant will be
subject to the same law and resolution of factual disputes as is the litigation claimant or
defendant.
Consequently, an arbitration award that is clearly incorrect in its
determination of facts or application of law is defective.
Thus, to find facts in a clearly incorrect way and to be mistaken regarding the law
is imperfect. To “execute” can mean to “perform as required” and to “perform skillfully
or properly” as in executing a sports play, military maneuver, or other task.295 But these
are secondary definitions to the primary definition of “to carry out fully” or “to put
completely into effect.” When reading “execute” in conjunction with the rest of the
words of § 10(4), the more natural reading of “so imperfectly executed [their powers] that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made”
suggests that this portion of the Act was focused on defects such as lack of finality, lack
of clarity, mis-naming of parties, oversight in failing to address a claim, and similar
defects that are more technical and go less to the substantive merits of the dispute.
Although text alone does not make a powerful case for expanded § 10 judicial
review of arbitration awards, the text of the Act does not completely foreclose a
construction of § 10(4) that invalidates awards when there are palpable errors of factfinding or clearly inaccurate application of the law. While text may be the first-amongequals of statutory interpretation tools, only the most fundamentalist textualists are
unwilling to consider other factors.296 Because the Court itself, including those
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professing textualism in other contexts, have treated some portions of the Act
dynamically, consideration of non-textual factors cannot fairly be foreclosed in trying to
harmonize § 10 review with other portions of the Court’s modern Federal Arbitration Act
jurisprudence.
Legislative intent unsurprisingly tends to favor a constricted reading of § 10(4),
and § 10 generally. As previously noted, the proponents of the Act and Congress
envisioned arbitration as the consensual commercial, industrial, and guild arbitration of
insiders, not the modern mass imposition of arbitration on tenuous grounds where
consent is suspect. But if the statutory interpreter’s goal is vindication of a specific
original legislative intent, § 10 does not support review of arbitration that parallels review
of trial decisions.
The general congressional purpose underlying the Act admits more easily of
expanded judicial review. Although the Congress of 1925 and the interest groups
pushing for the Act (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce) did not contemplate today’s mass
arbitration, neither is there any indication that they wished to expand imposed arbitration
so broadly or to have large swaths of consumer, employment, or other disputes between
businesses and individuals transferred to a privatized system with only minimal judicial
review. There is actually some indication that the 1925 Congress, had it known what
would develop in Southland’s wake, would have disapproved. The enacting Congress
specifically included § 1 of the Act, barring enforcement of arbitration clauses contained
in contracts of employment.
Despite the defanging of this provision in Gilmer and Circuit City, it remains
standing as a powerful indication that the enacting Congress had considerable misgivings
about this type of imposed mass arbitration. That same Congress would likely have held
similar reservations about imposed mass arbitration of consumer disputes. Viewed in this
light, § 10 of the Act may be an apt candidate for the “imaginative reconstruction”
suggested by Judge Richard Posner, an approach that stops short of a fully evolutionary,
updating, or Calabresian common law approach but has elements of the dynamic
approach. Judge Posner’s suggestion: when faced with a situation beyond the
contemplation of the Congress that enacted the statute, courts should attempt to envision
what the enacting Congress would have done had it contemplated the current situation.297
Given what the 1925 Congress did in § 1, it is not farfetched to conclude that had it
known that its new law would result in mass arbitration of consumer and other disputes
pitting business against individuals, that Congress would have wanted § 10 to be
construed in a manner that provided meaningful judicial policing of such arbitration
outcomes.
Consideration of interest group impact also supports a broader application of
§ 10(4) when modern mass arbitration is involved. Scholars divide on the question of
what to do about the unavoidable influence of interest groups on legislation. Most
suggest that courts should attempt to fight against this in various ways and to limit the
special interest aspects of legislation, even though the language of a statute and its
indicia of statutory meaning); Peter Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225
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legislative history require that the victorious interest group obtain at least some of the
spoils of political victory.298 Others argue, to again paraphrase Senator Hayakawa,
assuming that interest groups won fair and square299 (e.g., without bribery or coercion by
merely effective means of the legal means of influencing public policy), that courts
should construe the law to give the prevailing interest group its full measure of legislative
victory.300
Under either approach, an interest group analysis of § 10(4) does not limit a
court’s ability to read it broadly in favor of more expansive judicial review of arbitration
awards. The driving forces behind the Act were merchant groups such as the Chamber of
Commerce. Their goal was to obtain judicial enforcement of the traditional commercial
and guild arbitration clauses commonly contained in their contracts. Although the
successors to these groups generally like what the Burger, Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have done in expanding their ability to impose arbitration en masse upon consumers and
employees, this was not part of the original interest group activity leading to passage of
the Act. Consequently, even under the “conservative” approach more supportive of
holding fast to the legislative victories of interest groups, there is no compelling reason to
cleave to a narrow approach to § 10(4).301 The more liberal attitude toward interest group
activity logically supports greater judicial resistance to special interest group legislation
and thus resistance to a continuing narrow view of § 10 review.
While an originalist view of the Act supports the status quo of highly deferential
review of arbitration awards, a more dynamic approach strongly augers in favor of more
searching review commensurate with the changes in arbitration wrought by Southland
and its progeny. Put simply, it is a foolish consistency that adheres to a limited standard
of review designed for the commercial insider arbitration of the early 20th Century when
the early 21st Century is awash in imposed mass arbitration quite different than that
existing at the time the Act was passed. Although it would perhaps seem controversial or
unduly activist for judges to read § 10 more expansively on its own, it is hardly stretching
the boundaries of apt judicial behavior to give § 10 the same treatment the Court has
accorded §§ 2-4 for nearly 30 years.
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Once the door is open to dynamism, its analytic tools logically lead to § 10 review
of mass arbitration commensurate with judicial review of trial findings and rulings. A
purposive or interest group approach also supports this reading of § 10, while the text of
the section is only slightly adverse and at least subject to a construction in favor of
expansion. Even an originalist focus on legislative intent, perhaps the strongest factor
favoring continued narrow construction of § 10 and highly deferential judicial review, is
not particularly persuasive in light of the enacting legislature’s understandable ignorance
of the brave new world of mass arbitration the Court would usher in some 60 years later.
Weighed against other interpretative factors, this should not be sufficient to prevent more
expansive § 10(4) review commensurate with the modern world of mass arbitration.
By contrast, the manifest disregard of law standard is a bit timid in requiring that
the arbitrator must be apprised of the correct law and willfully disregard it in order to
make the award vulnerable.302 When trial courts err, appellate courts do not hinge their
reversal on whether the judge was adequately presented with the correct law by the
parties. Rather, the judge is expected to find and apply applicable law correctly even in
the face of bad lawyering. Now that arbitration has become the new litigation, a similar
burden should be placed on arbitrators.
Because of the problems posed by this requirement, which creates unnecessary
potential for debate as to the state of the record below (i.e., was the arbitrator really
adequately briefed on the law by counsel), future application of “error of law” review of
arbitration awards should dispense with this requirement (although continued use of
manifest disregard review in apt cases is completely consistent with this article’s
suggested approach). Scrutiny or an expanded review of arbitration awards for basic
legal accuracy should become a required part of future arbitration jurisprudence. If
arbitration is to replace litigation as a default, it should also include the default rule that
the award must comply with the substantive law applicable to the dispute.
In addition to improving the judicial quality control exerted over arbitration, a
move toward greater law-based review of arbitration decisions would be jurisprudentially
satisfying in that it would bring application of § 10 of the Act into harmony with the
Supreme Court’s construction of the Act as a whole. Adoption of this approach would
also reduce the problems posed by Hall Street,303 in which the Court refused to permit the
parties themselves to provide for expanded judicial review. So long as an arbitration
agreement does not provide for review beyond the standard form of appellate quality
control sought in this article (for modern mass arbitration awards), the parties’ agreement
seeking to customize review should be respected unless it places an undue burden on a
court or is otherwise substantially inconsistent with the court’s adjudicative role.
A loose end of sorts remains. If this article’s proposed dynamic reading of
§ 10(4) for modern mass arbitration is adopted, the Hall Street problem is largely
obviated. But what about the converse: an arbitration agreement that provides for review
even narrower or more deferential than that provided pursuant to § 10.304 Hall Street
suggests that this type of party agreement does not run afoul of the Act or improperly
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permit the parties to impose on the judiciary because it reduces judicial workload (by
requiring even less judicial scrutiny than that available pursuant to the § 10).305
But this view is of course subject to question and criticism. A major rationale for
expanded arbitration in the Southland era has been the argument that arbitration is not
substandard justice but simply a type of forum selection. Even for regular § 10 review,
this argument is problematic. Sure, arbitration is a type of forum selection – but it is
forum selection with substantive implications such as no jury trial, reduced discovery,
absence of stringent evidentiary rules, as well as highly deferential judicial review in
place of the norm of appellate review as quality control.
If the parties are permitted to restrict judicial review even further than the limited
review provided by § 10, this may reduce the workload of courts but it does so at the cost
of making arbitration even more substantively different than litigation. This does not
pose a significant problem where the arbitration is of the traditional commercial or
industry variety in existence at the time the Act was passed, arbitrations in which the
disputants frequently wanted decision based on the specialized or informal norms of their
fields. But the continued highly deferential approach to application of § 10 exacerbates
the problems of modern mass arbitration as a substitute for litigation by making such
privatized justice even less protective of litigants than ordinary arbitration.
Consequently, an apt approach to the “reverse-Hall Street” problem should
continue the apparent norm of allowing parties to restrict review and avoid otherwise
applicable law in cases involving traditional arbitration. However, where the dispute is
subject to modern mass arbitration of the type that did not exist prior to Southland, the
arbitration agreement should not be permitted to eject the application of law or to avoid
the dynamic application of § 10(4) advocated in this article.
V. CONCLUSION
Rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court has during the past 30 years expanded the
scope of the Federal Arbitration Act through dynamic statutory construction more
judicially activist than the better known mainstream jurisprudence involving text,
legislative history, and congressional intent. As a result of the Court’s efforts, the
incidence and role of arbitration has expanded well beyond what was intended by the
enacting Congress or what is mandated by the Act’s text, albeit with some disturbing
inconsistency that suggests the Court favors arbitration as a tool of business more than as
an improvement over litigation or as a means of facilitating party autonomy and freedom
of contract.
Assuming no retrenchment in this 30-year trend, a glaring problem of asymmetry
remains. While compulsion of arbitration has expanded due to the Court’s dynamic
statutory construction of §§ 2, 3, and 4 of the Act, protection of workers from adhesion
contracts of arbitration under § 1 of the Act and review of arbitration awards pursuant to
§ 10 has remained static. The result is a missed opportunity to exercise greater quality
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control over arbitration as well as jurisprudential inconsistency. The Court (or lower
courts as a precursor to High Court review) can fix this problem by recognizing that – at
least in modern mass arbitrations imposed on consumers and employees – that § 10(4) of
the Act permits courts to vacate arbitration awards reflecting clear errors of factual
determination or application of law. Such errors are sufficiently “imperfect” arbitrations
to justify judicial rejection.
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